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The following dissertation comprises three self-contained chapters that describe 
several mechanisms by which financial factors can impact banks' ability or willingness to 
supply credit.  Given banks' unique position at the front lines of monetary transmission, it 
is important for policy makers to fully understand how the financial condition of banks 
can lead to changes in credit supply that can in turn impact the real economy.  
Intermediated credit has no reasonable substitute for many firms in the United States.  
This is especially true for small businesses that make significant contributions to 
employment and growth and often depend on relationship-based bank credit as an 
important source of funds.   
 Chapters II and III help define the role that banks play in the propagation of 
monetary policy.  Deepening the understanding how monetary policy is transmitted 
through the economy is essential for both evaluating the stance of policy at a given time 
and assessing the timing and effect of monetary actions.  Chapter II presents an empirical 
test of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy.  According to this channel, 
 v 
 
 
monetary policy actions impact the financial position of borrowers, causing banks to 
withdraw credit.  I provide evidence that a subset of banks exhibit a balance sheet 
channel that can lead to significant reductions in lending to small firms.  Chapter III 
constructs a test for a recently described channel of monetary policy known as the bank 
capital channel.  In this chapter, I demonstrate that the sensitivity of banks' capital 
positions to monetary policy can be used to explain cross-sectional differences in loan 
growth.  This study not only adds to the scarce capital channel literature but also 
highlights important interactions between the regulatory and stabilization functions of 
most modern central banks.  Finally, Chapter IV develops a new "early warning" 
methodology that can be used to help forecast the financial health of banks, which affects 
their ability to extend credit.  Included in the chapter is an application in which I identify 
some predictors of the severity of stress large banks realized during the height of the 
subprime mortgage crisis.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In most developed countries, financial institutions occupy a unique place in the 
fabric of the economy.  To the extent that banks play a significant role in the allocation of 
private credit, bank behavior and attitudes can contain crucial information about future 
economic growth.  Furthermore, since banks (as the proximate counterparty in Federal 
Reserve policy actions) are at the front lines of the monetary transmission mechanism, it 
is crucial to understand how banks might facilitate or frustrate the intentions of central 
bankers.  With this in mind, the following essays present expositions of how bank 
balance sheets can generate potentially important changes in the supply of credit as a 
result of (1) changes in the stance of monetary policy or (2) severe bank-level financial 
distress.  
At their most basic level, chapters two and three each catalogue a part of the 
monetary transmission mechanism.  These chapters demonstrate that tighter monetary 
policy impacts the balance sheets of borrowers and lenders in ways that lead to a 
contraction of the supply of credit.  Though chapters two and three catalogue different 
channels of monetary policy (the credit channel and the capital channel, respectively) 
they each clarify banks' role in the transmission of monetary policy.  Furthermore, each 
channel seems to operate mostly through small banks.  This distributional asymmetry in 
the transmission of monetary policy should be of concern to policy makers, particularly 
since the clients of large and small banks differ. 
 2 
 
 
 The third chapter also has implications for the interaction between the regulatory 
and stabilization responsibilities of the central bank.  In the wake of the financial crisis, 
the Federal Reserve's role as a regulator has taken on an increased level of importance.  
For instance, a new regulatory body has been created within the Fed and the text of the 
Federal Reserve Act has been altered in a way that stresses the importance of the central 
bank's regulatory authority.  This redoubled regulatory focus represents the overlap 
between the third and fourth chapters.  The fourth chapter constructs a model of bank 
stress that adds to the “early warning system” literature, which focuses on constructing 
models of bank failure.  The model described below is specifically designed to help alert 
regulators to financial institutions that may come under significant financial stress even 
when the ultimate result is not failure.  As a bank regulator the Federal Reserve is, ipso 
facto, interested in the development of an early warning system for bank stress.  
Moreover, instances of severe stress among banks are associated with disruptions in 
credit.  Since these disruptions can also be important for monetary transmission, central 
bankers have multiple reasons to take an interest in these models.   
 The rest of the dissertation is organized into three self-contained essays as 
follows.  Chapter II presents an empirical test of the “balance sheet channel” of monetary 
policy.  A theoretical model of the channel is constructed and results consistent with the 
predictions of the model are presented for a subset of banks.  Chapter III outlines the 
more recently described “capital channel” of monetary policy and presents two tests that 
are consistent with its operation through small banks.  Chapter IV develops a multiple 
indicator multiple cause model of bank stress during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.  This 
model not only catalogues the causes of bank stress in this particular crisis but - relative 
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to the existing early warning system literature - also expands the notion of bank distress.  
Chapter V provides brief concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER II 
MONETARY POLICY AND BANK  
LENDING TO SMALL FIRMS 
 
1. Introduction 
 Understanding how monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy is central 
to the study of macroeconomics.  It has been established that the policy induced changes 
in the cost of capital are insufficient to explain the magnitude, timing, and composition of 
the economic response.1  To reconcile this, the traditional “interest-rate view” has been 
augmented by theoretical and empirical evidence of a so-called credit channel of 
monetary policy.  Models of the credit channel show that financial market imperfections 
amplify the effects of monetary policy via two distinct sub-channels.  As described in 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the “bank lending channel” predicts a decline in the 
aggregate level of credit extended by banks in response to a monetary tightening.  While 
this channel arises due to lower system-wide reserves, an additional “balance sheet 
channel” described by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) predicts a disruption in credit 
extension as a result of procyclical movement in borrowers' financial positions caused by 
monetary policy.  With imperfect information and heterogeneous borrowers, models of 
                                                 
1
 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Hubbard (2000) for a review. 
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the credit channel predict tighter credit standards that lower the share of loans extended to 
less credit-worthy firms.2 
 If financial intermediaries do respond to higher real interest rates with a “flight to 
quality” as argued by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), then this compositional 
shift in banks’ loan portfolios is part of the monetary transmission mechanism.  The 
primary purpose of this paper is to present evidence that uniquely identifies the balance 
sheet channel of monetary policy.  Importantly, the method used to identify the balance 
sheet channel within this paper will be valid even in the presence of both the interest rate 
and bank lending channels.  While there has been relatively strong evidence for a credit 
channel of monetary policy in recent years (see Mishkin, 2007 for a summary), many 
papers fail to differentiate between the bank lending and balance sheet hypotheses (e.g. 
Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994; Kashyap, Lamont, & Stein, 1994; Morgan, 1998).  There is 
also a body of work that finds support for a specific channel, but either uses aggregate 
data as in Lang and Nakamura (1995) or disaggregate data specific to a single sector 
(Kashyap, Stein, & Wilcox, 1993; Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994; Oliner & Rudebusch, 1995).  
Although strong evidence is reported in the aforementioned studies, each limitation 
presents a disadvantage.  First, making use of aggregate data precludes the identification 
of heterogeneity amongst financial intermediaries and/or borrowers.  Secondly, 
employing individual sectoral data presents a sampling problem.  To the extent that a 
single sector (usually manufacturing) is not representative of the aggregate economy, one 
must be cautious in making conclusions or policy decisions based on these studies.   
                                                 
2
 For a thorough discussion of the distinction between the balance sheet and bank lending channels see 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). 
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 In this paper, I analyze data on virtually all domestic banks to conclude that 
certain groups of banks exhibit a significant flight to quality in response to a monetary 
tightening.  Using disaggregate data, Kashyap and Stein (1994) show that the 
composition of bank balance sheets varies significantly across different size classes of 
banks.  In a follow-up paper Kashyap and Stein (2000) go further to show that smaller 
banks are most likely to behave in a manner consistent with the bank lending channel.  I 
employ a comparable data set and examine a small-business-loan-to-total (SBL) ratio to 
argue that similar patterns emerge in the propagation of the balance sheet channel.  In 
response to a shift towards tighter monetary policy, banks adjust the composition of their 
loan portfolios away from small, high-agency-cost borrowers.3  According to the U.S. 
Small Business Administration, small businesses employ half of all private sector 
employees and account for more than half of all private sector output.  For this reason, 
distributional effects of monetary policy manifested in the balance sheet channel are of 
interest to a host of policy makers, including elected representatives, the U.S. Small 
Business Administration, and the Federal Reserve. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes a model 
motivating a method by which a balance sheet channel may operate alongside an interest 
rate channel.  The strategy used to identify the balance sheet channel is outlined in 
Section III.  Section IV outlines the data used, presents the estimated model, and 
describes the econometric method employed.  Section V contains the results of the 
estimation, and Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
3
 Much research exists to suggest that small, relatively young firms are likely to have higher agency costs.  
See, for example Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) and the references therein.  In particular, Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen (2008) provide evidence that firm age may be a better proxy for measuring agency costs.  Since I 
do not observe borrower age, I identify the balance sheet channel by using borrower size.   
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2. Theory 
 The balance sheet channel of monetary policy has two requirements.  First, 
monetary policy actions must affect market interest rates.4  Second, any increase in 
interest rates must impact the financial positions of borrowers.  There are several means 
by which interest rates may impact firms’ balance sheets and income statements.  The 
most obvious way in which rising interest rates can impact a firm’s balance sheet is 
through its financing structure.  To the extent that firms are at all reliant on short-term 
debt (or floating rate debt of longer maturity), higher interest rates reduce net cash flows.  
Lower profits reduce the net worth of firms relative to an environment with no interest 
rate shocks.  Additionally, since higher interest rates are linked to lower asset prices, 
higher interest rates will shrink the value of debtor collateral.5 
 If these firm-level responses to monetary policy lead to a reduced access to credit, 
firms will respond by scaling back production and factor inputs.  Before turning to the 
issue of which firms may find their access to credit markets impaired, I will first motivate 
the credit channel by presenting a theory that relates higher interest rates to firms’ net 
worth and collateral.   
 Following the simplifications to Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model presented in 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), suppose entrepreneurs use inputs in period 0 to 
                                                 
4
 Since many firms use short-term debt to finance their working capital, we only require that Federal 
Reserve actions impact short-term interest rates. 
 
5
 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a further, “indirect” impact of monetary policy on net cash flows. 
While this additional impact on downstream customers is likely a significant driver of firm profits it is not 
important for the model presented here. 
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produce output of a final good in period 1.  There is a single final good, but required 
inputs are of two types: a fixed factor of production K and a variable factor v1.  In period 
1, output is produced with the production function 1 1( )a f v  where a1 is some technology 
parameter and ( )f i  satisfies the Inada conditions.  At this point the fixed factor may be 
sold for a unit price of p1 and the variable factor of production depreciates fully in use. 
 Each entrepreneur inherits a cash balance of 0 0( )a f v  and a liability of 0 0r b  from 
borrowing in previous periods.  The entrepreneur completes period 0 by choosing v1 and 
b1 to maximize net output.  Thus, the entrepreneur’s maximization problem is: 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1
,
max ( ) ( )
v b
a f v rb−
 (2.1) 
 s.t. 1 0 0 1 0 0( )v a f v b r b= + −  (2.2) 
where the price of the variable input has been normalized to one and r1 is the real interest 
rate applied to borrowed funds that will be paid back in period 1 (b1).  Equation (2.2) 
simply states that the amount of variable input purchased will be equal to the cash flow 
available to the entrepreneur net of interest payments.  The credit constrained 
entrepreneur then faces the familiar first order condition relating marginal revenues to 
marginal costs:  
 1 1 1'( )a f v r≥  (2.3) 
 Next, imagine a role for finance similar to that in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1996).  If it is costly for a lender to confiscate output of the final good in the event of 
default, the lender would require that the (easily transferable) fixed factor be posted as 
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collateral for a loan.  In this situation the lender will ensure that outstanding debt never 
exceeds the value of the collateral.6  This then puts a ceiling on the amount of b1 equal to 
the market value of the fixed factor in period 1.  That is: 
 1 1 1rb p K≤  (2.4) 
which – when combined with the constraint (2.2) – gives: 
 
1
1 0 0 0 0
1
( ) p Kv a f v r b
r
≤ + −  (2.5) 
 Equation (2.5) relates an entrepreneur’s investment spending to his net worth in 
period 0.  If total net worth is less than the unconstrained value of investment from (2.2), 
then (2.5) will bind and the entrepreneur will purchase a sub-optimal value of v1. 
 This model demonstrates the mechanism by which the balance sheet channel 
should work.  If interest rates rise and (2.5) binds, then a borrower will be forced to 
reduce spending on the input which leads to lower production.  In this case, the 
production effect may be driven by two mechanisms which may operate simultaneously.  
First, the present value of the fixed (collateralizable) asset decreases in the interest rate.  
Second, the firm may experience higher financing costs, lowering net cash flow.7  Both 
                                                 
6
 If this were not the case, the defaulted borrower would have the leverage to re-negotiate a smaller loan 
with his creditors.  See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
 
7
 That is, r0b0 could increase if the firm has short term debt it must roll over, or if a portion of the firm’s 
interest obligations are not fixed rate. 
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of these effects reduce the entrepreneur’s net worth and drive the balance sheet channel 
described above.8 
 
3. Identification 
 In order to investigate patterns in the extension of credit to high-agency-cost 
borrowers, I construct small-business-loan-to-total SBL ratios that measure the 
proportion of each bank’s total commercial loan book invested in loans to small firms.  
The data contain information on loans to small firms classified as either commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans or loans secured by a firm’s property, plants, or equipment 
(hereafter referred to as 'real estate’ loans).  Using these SBL ratios as the outcome to 
identify a balance sheet channel is a unique feature of this study.  It is in this way that I 
attempt to directly measure banks' loan portfolio positioning to demonstrate a mechanism 
by which small firms disproportionately lose access to external funds.  Previous studies 
such as Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), and Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) provide evidence of the differential response of high-
agency-cost (usually small) firm spending and investment decisions.  However, these 
authors assume intermediate financial frictions that lead to their results while it is the aim 
of this paper to use bank balance sheets to demonstrate a manifestation of these frictions.9  
                                                 
8
 If (2.5) does not bind, then a rise in r1 leads to a higher hurdle rate for investment projects, reducing 
spending on v1.  This can be easily seen by equation (2.3) and is a manifestation of the standard interest rate 
channel of monetary policy. 
 
9
 The readjustment of bank loan books described here is likely not the only manifestation of these frictions.  
The non-price terms of lending are other obvious examples. 
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 Though the SBL ratios here can be viewed as the complement of Lang and 
Nakamura's (1995) "% safe" variable, I use disaggregate data to test the balance sheet 
channel on a micro level.  As such, I am able to identify any distributional effects of 
monetary policy across both banks and borrowers.  Other studies have made use of 
similar SBL ratios as outcome variables, but their primary purpose has been to explore 
the relationship between bank consolidation and its impact on credit extension.10 
 The idea that small borrowers may be more susceptible to monetary policy 
tightening is not a new one, and dates to Galbraith (1957) and Bach and Huizenga (1960).  
There are several reasons to expect that the burden of tighter credit standards should fall 
disproportionately on small firms and thereby generate measurable changes in real 
activity.  First, small firms have lower collateralizable net worth (by definition), leading 
to greater incentive incompatibility.  Secondly, unconditional survival rates are lower for 
small firms and bankruptcy costs are proportionately larger for small borrowers due to 
the fixed costs associated with monitoring and evaluation.11  Finally, smaller firms are 
less diversified which increases idiosyncratic risk.  
 As mentioned earlier, the balance sheet channel predicts a reduction in the net 
supply of loans to less creditworthy borrowers.  This of course leads to the question of 
whether an observed reduction in the share of loans to small firms (i.e. a fall in the SBL 
ratio) may instead be evidence of a shift in demand only.  Fortunately, however, much 
evidence exists to dispute an initial fall in small firm demand for bank loans.  Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1996) and Milne (1991) argue that small firms initially demand more loans in 
                                                 
10
 See Strahan and Weston (1998) and Peek and Rosengren (1998) for examples. 
 
11
 Morgan (1992) contains many references to literature suggesting that bankruptcy costs are 
proportionately higher for small firms. 
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the face of a monetary contraction.  This is due in part to the sharper decrease in sales 
small firms experience relative to their larger counterparts.  Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) 
find that small firms become more dependent on internal financing for investment 
spending in response to a monetary contraction than do large firms.  The authors take this 
result as an indication that small firms experience a scarcity of external financing.  Large 
firms similarly increase their loan demand to smooth the impact of lower sales (and 
finance higher inventories) with more success than small companies.  Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek (1996) note that all firms would like to increase their borrowing to smooth the 
effect of declining cash flows, but only certain firms are able to access the desired funds.  
In fact, the disproportionately negative effect of tight money on small firm sales 
demonstrated by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) would lead one to expect small firms to 
increase their demand for external funds by a greater amount than large firms.  It seems 
clear that the optimal amount of inventory smoothing, labor hoarding, etc. in response to 
monetary tightening is not due to a different optimization strategy, but rather arises from 
an external financing constraint.  That is, the stress placed on firms as a result of 
contractionary monetary policy leads small firm demand for external financing to 
increase by approximately as much as that of large firms, and perhaps more.   
 An important difference, however, is that large companies can access financial 
markets to satisfy some of this demand.  Due to the increase in financing premiums 
induced by tighter monetary policy, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) demonstrate that 
the proportion of commercial paper to bank loans rises.  The authors interpret this shift as 
a result of a contraction of reserves by the Fed, forcing some borrowers to the 
commercial paper market.  For the purposes of identification in the current study, the 
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important conclusion from Kashyap, et. al. is much more simplistic: large firms have 
been shown to access financial markets in order to satisfy some portion of their loan 
demand subsequent to monetary tightening.12  Small firms, for the most part, do not have 
the option of tapping financial markets for needed funds and must rely almost exclusively 
on internal funds and intermediated credit to finance investment (Gertler & Gilchrist, 
1996).  The authors also show that trade credit extended to small firms actually decreases 
in response to an increase in the FFR, and is therefore not acting as a substitute for bank 
lending.  Indeed, it appears as if the operation of the balance sheet propagation 
mechanism may also work through large firm management of receivables and payables.  
This provides yet another reason for small firm loan demand to increase relative to large 
firms.  With fewer financing options, any withdrawal of bank credit should produce a 
larger economic response in small firms. 
 Notice that these borrower reactions – the increased demand for loans by small 
firms and the ability of large firms to substitute away from intermediated credit – work to 
raise the SBL ratio.  That is, the similar increase in loan demand coupled with large firms' 
propensity to satisfy some portion of this in financial markets serve to increase the SBL 
ratio after a monetary contraction.  As a consequence, any decrease in loan portfolio risk 
(represented by a fall in the SBL ratio) following an increase in the FFR can be viewed as 
strong evidence of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. 
 Given the higher relative liquidity constraints that affect the investment decisions 
of small firms (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1998; Gilchrist, 1990) and the importance 
                                                 
12
 In fact, using the data described above to regress large firm C&I loan growth on controls (included in 
later regressions) shows an insignificant to negative change in response to tighter monetary policy.  In 
isolation, this would cause the SBL ratio to increase. 
 14 
 
 
of these small firms to the American economy (Mishkin, 2008), these shifts in bank loan 
portfolios can be an important source of the observed fluctuation in real activity 
precipitated by monetary policy.  As demonstrated by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), 
responses of small firms tend to be so large that they can impact entire sectors even if 
they have a relatively low representation within those sectors.  It seems likely that a 
decline in net new loans to small firms described above may be attributed to the types of 
credit market imperfections associated with theories of the balance sheet channel.  
 
4. Data and Empirical Method 
 
4.1. Data  
 The data used here are taken from the Consolidated Report of Condition and 
Income (also known as the Call Reports).  Detailed balance sheet and income statement 
data are available within these reports for all banks regulated by the Federal Reserve 
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.  
Though Call Reports are filed at the individual bank level, a case might be made for 
aggregating the data up to the holding company level (see Houston, James, & Marcus, 
1997 and Ashcraft, 2007).  However, analysis at the bank level is supported by the 
findings of Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) who show that the majority of banks are 
unaffiliated with a holding company.  Furthermore, holding companies of all sizes tend to 
be dominated by a single bank.  As a robustness check of the results presented below, 
individual banks were aggregated to the holding company level.  Such an adjustment 
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does not alter the conclusions reached below, so all tables are reported at the individual 
bank level.13  
 To measure each bank’s exposure to less credit-worthy borrowers, observations 
are made annually beginning in 1993Q2 and ending in 2008Q2.14    Several exclusion 
criteria are imposed to remove those banks with limited relevance or presence in the data. 
First, banks that file a Call Report in no more than two years are excluded.  A second 
filter removes those bank-quarters that have missing values for either total assets or total 
loans.  In most instances this filter removes banks that are out of business due to failure 
or merger (the loans of merged banks are counted on the books of the acquirer).  As a 
robustness check, a third filter was applied to remove banks for which C&I loans 
comprise less than five percent of the total loan book.  Since it is immaterial to the main 
findings, this exclusion criterion was not included in the tables presented below.   
 The net result of these filters is a data set that contains 129,291 bank-quarters 
across 10,634 individual banks.  The assets for various bank size classes are summarized 
in Table 2.1.  Panel A of Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the groups as of 
1993Q2.  Panel B contains identical summary statistics as of 2008Q2.  There are several 
patterns worth noting.  First, the distribution of banks by total assets is highly skewed; 
containing many more small banks than large ones.  Second, all banks – especially small 
ones – maintained a much higher balance of cash and securities relative to total assets in 
the 1993 sample than in the 2008 sample.  Finally, small banks invest more of their 
                                                 
13
 For further discussion on the issue of bank aggregation, see Kashyap and Stein (2000). 
 
14
 Banks began reporting loans to small businesses in their second quarter Call Report pursuant to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.  
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balance sheet in loans to small businesses.  It appears that banks below the 98th percentile 
shifted into loans and out of cash and securities during the sample period.   
 Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2000) 
provide discussions of various potential measures of monetary policy used in recent 
years.  As mentioned, the most important driver of the balance sheet channel is the real 
interest rate, which should be influenced by the stance of monetary policy if prices are 
sticky.  Since alternative measures of monetary policy mentioned above provide similar 
results (see Appendix A), my primary measure of monetary policy will be the real federal 
funds rate (FFR) as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993).  
Note that the sample period here skirts the common criticism of employing the FFR as a 
measure of monetary policy during the Volcker years.15 
 Two primary SBL ratios are calculated and used as dependent variables.  
Descriptive statistics for the SBL ratios are included in Panels A and B of Table 2.1.  
SBL1 represents small C&I loans as a percent of all C&I loans.  The second SBL ratio - 
SBL2 - measures the ratio of small C&I and commercial real estate (CRE) loans to all 
C&I and CRE loans.  Since all loans less than one million dollars are classified as loans 
to small businesses in the Call Reports I calculate a second set of SBL ratios analogous to 
SBL1 and SBL2 that consider only those commercial loans less than $250,000 to be 
small business loans.  The results reported below are very similar when the alternative 
SBL measures are used (see Appendix A).  Given the relative ease of taking delivery of 
collateral posted as a condition of real estate lending, one might expect real estate loans 
to exhibit a lesser sensitivity to monetary tightening relative to C&I loans. 
                                                 
15
 See Walsh (2003) for a comprehensive review. 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for key variables by bank size (grouped by percentile 
ranks). 
 
Panel A - Bank Balance Sheet Summary Statistics by Asset Class (1993 Q2)
Number of banks
Mean assets (millions of 2008 $)
Median assets (millions of 2008 $)
Fraction of system wide assets
Fraction of total class assets
Cash + Securities
Total loans
Fraction of total class loans
Small business loans
Commercial real estate
C & I loans
Mean loans (millions of 2008 $)
Median loans (millions of 2008 $)
Fraction of system wide loans
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Liquidity 0.38 0.16 0.32 0.15 0.27 0.13
Net Interest Margin 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
SBL1 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.33 0.28 0.21
SBL2 0.39 0.46 0.51 0.30 0.29 0.21
SBL1 (<250K) 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.14 0.14
SBL2 (<250K) 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.11
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th
8161 580 151
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th
115.09 1,367.65 20,212.32
9,604.50
0.640.170.20
79.99
0.40
0.55
0.17
0.09
0.08
41.33
0.19
0.35
0.59
0.17
0.09
0.09
0.28
0.59
0.07
0.03
63.56
987.46
0.04
11,862.44
6,056.03
0.64
807.30
579.29
0.17
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Table 2.1. (continued) 
 
Panel B - Bank Balance Sheet Summary Statistics by Asset Class (2008 Q2)
Number of banks
Mean assets (millions of $)
Median assets (millions of $)
Fraction of system wide assets
Fraction of total class assets
Cash + Securities
Total loans
Fraction of total class loans
Small business loans
Commercial real estate
C & I loans
Mean loans (millions of $)
Median loans (millions of $)
Fraction of system wide loans
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Liquidity 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.12
Net Interest Margin 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
SBL1 0.72 0.32 0.51 0.23 0.26 0.22
SBL2 0.66 0.31 0.41 0.19 0.28 0.22
SBL1 (<250K) 0.43 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.19
SBL2 (<250K) 0.30 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.19
Panel C - Key Bank-Invariant Covariates
Mean Std. Dev.
GDP 2.85% 0.62%
Unemployment 5.27% 0.74%
BAA - AAA Spread 0.84% 0.24%
Federal Funds Rate 4.01% 1.78%
Inflation (Core CPI) 2.40% 0.48%
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th
5921 548 97
196.60 2,142.38 94,303.54
136.29 1,506.74 25,348.66
0.10 0.10 0.80
0.23 0.22 0.19
0.70 0.71 0.55
0.24 0.16 0.06
0.15 0.09 0.03
0.10 0.07 0.03
138.43 1,522.27 52,243.49
91.13 1,099.61 14,251.00
0.12 0.12 0.75
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th
 
 It should be noted that the stock of loans is observed in the Call Reports rather 
than the flow.  Any changes in the stock of loans are then a net result of loan contracts 
expiring without renewal, charge-offs, and the issuance of new credit extension.  Rather 
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than measuring changes in the flow of new credit extension - which is arguably 
preferable - I proxy for this by using the change in the stock of loans as is common in the 
literature (Bernanke & Lown, 1991).  On the other hand, since observations are made 
annually it is plausible to view the variation in the SBL ratio as a bank choice. 
 
4.2. Empirical Method 
 In order to estimate the effects of the FFR on the share of banks’ loans to small 
firms as a proportion of their total loans, it is necessary to employ dynamic panel data 
estimation techniques.  This is due to the possibility of serial correlation in the error 
terms.  Intuitively, one would expect a regression explaining loan book composition to 
exhibit a moderate degree of serial correlation given the quasi-contractual nature of these 
assets.  For instance, in response to a shock to monetary policy, Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992) observe a substantial delay in the expected decrease in loans on a banks’ balance 
sheets.  Though the evidence presented by the authors applies more to the bank lending 
channel, they argue that the reason for the substantial delay has its roots in the inherent 
stickiness of loans as an asset. 
 Recent innovations in dynamic panel data estimation have concentrated on 
providing optimal linear Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators while 
imposing relatively weak assumptions with respect to the exogeneity of the covariates.16  
The typical approach is to first-difference the equation to eliminate any permanent 
unobserved heterogeneity and use lagged levels of the series as instruments for any 
                                                 
16
 See Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) for a review of the recent literature. 
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predetermined and endogenous variables as in Arellano and Bond (1991).  However, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the instruments in the Arellano-Bond estimator 
become weak as the autoregressive process becomes persistent.  The Blundell-Bond 
GMM estimator makes use of additional instruments to provide significant efficiency 
gains.17  Additionally, this estimator easily accommodates models with weakly 
exogenous covariates.  Considering the serial correlation as well as the presence of 
weakly exogenous regressors exhibited in the model I estimate below, the Blundell-Bond 
estimator is preferred. 
 Suppressing the constant term, the dynamic panel data model to be estimated here 
takes the form 
 
1
'
L
it j it j t it it
j
y y FFR x uα γ β
−
=
= + + +∑  (2.6) 
 it i itu η υ= +  (2.7) 
for i = 1, …, N banks and t = 2, …, T, where i itη υ+  is the usual “error components” 
decomposition of the error term.  For the data set used in this study N is large, t takes a 
maximum value of sixteen, and 1jα <  where L is chosen to produce white noise 
residuals.  In equation (2.6) γ is the key coefficient and itx  is a column vector of 
                                                 
17
 Specifically, the Blundell-Bond estimator uses moment conditions in which lagged differences are used 
as instruments for the level equation in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments 
for the differenced equation. 
 
 21 
 
 
covariates described below.  The dependent variable y represents a measure of the 
proportion of total loans extended to high-agency-cost borrowers18 
 
total "small" loans
 
total loans
it
it
it
y =  (2.8) 
 Again, the key independent variable is the real FFR since this is an appropriate 
measure of the stance of monetary policy over the sample period.  The inflation rate used 
to determine the real FFR is the trailing twelve month inflation rate as measured by the 
core CPI.  The results reported below are robust to alternate measures of inflation, such 
as shorter trailing averages and the median expected price change as reported in the 
University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers.19  Since the real FFR increases as 
monetary policy tightens, a negative coefficient on this regressor is consistent with the 
theory of the balance sheet channel as described in the previous section.  A positive 
coefficient, on the other hand, would imply that banks increase the portion of their loan 
portfolio exposed to less creditworthy (small) businesses.  The latter scenario would not 
necessarily refute the existence of the balance sheet channel.  Instead, it could be the case 
that the upward pressures on the SBL after a monetary tightening described in Section 3 
dominate any shift in a change in banks' loan preferences. 
 The covariate vector itx  is comprised of eight additional regressors.  In all 
regressions (except as indicated in the robustness checks found in Appendix A) a time 
trend and a dummy variable for 2008 are included to remain consistent with the literature.  
                                                 
18
 For the purposes of the regressions below, a transformation of this ratio is used as the dependent variable.   
The results are not changed if observations at the extremes are omitted. 
 
19
 Another measure of expected inflation constructed using the procedure in Mishkin (1981) produced 
similar results.  See Appendix A for results produced using different measures of expected inflation. 
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The 2008 dummy is meant to capture the effects associated with the early stages of the 
credit crunch.  Although Appendix A considers dropping the time trend or replacing it 
with time fixed effects, it should be noted that panel-level unit root tests on the dependent 
variable strongly indicate stationarity.20  Other controls used to explain bank-level 
variation in exposure to small borrowers are compiled as follows.  For a measure of bank-
level liquidity, I follow Kashyap and Stein (2000) and use the ratio of securities plus 
federal funds sold to total assets.  Cash is excluded as it largely represents required 
reserves and therefore does not contribute to a bank’s liquid assets.  It appears from Table 
2.1 that bank size may influence the proportion of risky loans kept on the books.  To 
control for this, the log of each bank’s overall assets is included as an explanatory 
variable.  As a measure of real activity, a forecast of GDP growth is used.21  To remain 
consistent with the literature I also include a forecast of the unemployment rate.  Both 
forecasts are taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.  Since bank profits may 
affect the willingness of a bank to alter its risk structure – Mishkin (2007) contains a 
good summary – I include the net interest margin as a measure of bank profits.  It may be 
the case, however, that banks with a larger share of loans to small firms have a higher net 
interest margin to compensate for risk and agency costs.  The net interest margin is 
calculated by subtracting interest expense from interest revenue and dividing by total 
assets less property, plant, equipment, and intangibles.   
                                                 
20
 See Choi (2001) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) for descriptions of the multiple panel unit root tests 
employed. 
 
21
 The results are robust to the use of trailing averages of GDP growth (at both the state and national 
levels). 
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 The final component included in itx  is a measure of the credit risk-premium.  The 
reason to include this control is to ensure that any variation picked up by the coefficient 
on the FFR does not merely reflect the change in the market price of credit risk.  A 
widely accepted measure of credit risk is the spread of the yield on Baa rated bonds 
above the yield on Aaa bonds.  To smooth short term fluctuations, the average spread 
over the prior six months is used.  The results below are not altered significantly by 
substituting either the trailing twelve month average spread or the real-time spread.22  To 
avoid potential endogeneity issues I follow the literature and lag all bank-specific 
covariates.  Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table 2.1 Panels A, B, 
and C. 
 Lastly, it is natural to raise the question of whether there may be disparate effects 
of the balance sheet channel across banks of different sizes.  It is unclear whether one 
should expect, a priori, different types of lending behavior across large and small banks.  
The work of Kashyap and Stein (1994, 2000) suggests that large banks are less 
responsive to the effects of the credit channel.  However, Black and Rosen (2008) also 
control for loan maturities and debtor size, and obtain contradictory results that are 
consistent with the model presented in Stein (2002).  In Stein’s model, large banks have a 
greater sensitivity to the balance sheet channel (compared to small banks) as a result of 
relatively higher information gathering costs.  In light of this unresolved debate, the 
sample of banks in this analysis will be divided into size classes based on percentile ranks 
of total assets in each year.  Given the skewness of the size distribution, I assign each 
bank to one of three groups.  The small group contains all banks below the 90th 
                                                 
22
 The argument can be made that the Baa-Aaa spread is endogenous.  The Appendix contains results under 
an alternative specification that relaxes the strict exogeneity of this variable. 
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percentile, while the medium group consists of banks between the 90th and 98th 
percentiles.  Large banks will be defined as those above the 98th percentile.  All 
regressions in Section 5 are reported at the system-wide and group levels.23 
 
5. Results 
 The results - presented in Table 2.2 - are very similar for both SBL ratios, so I 
limit the discussion here to SBL1 (C&I loans only).24  Several points regarding the last 
column of Table 2.2 (Panel A) are worth noting.  The first concerns the sign and 
significance of the coefficient on the real federal funds rate.  Recall that this is the key 
independent variable as it best captures systematic changes in the stance of monetary 
policy.  The negative sign on this coefficient for the entire banking system indicates that 
increases in the real effective federal funds rate induces banks on the whole to shift their 
C&I loan book away from smaller firms.  For all banks, a coefficient of -0.229 on a log-
odds transformation of the dependent variable is economically meaningful.  A change of 
just twenty-five basis points in the real FFR implies that loans to small firms as a percent 
of banks’ commercial loan books falls by approximately four percent over the course of a 
year, all else equal.  In dollar terms, that would imply a nearly $16 billion reduction in 
small C&I credit (as of Q2 2008).   Since the results are driven by a subset of banks, it is 
instructive to estimate the impact based on the -0.291 coefficient associated with the 
smallest ninety percent of banks.  For these banks, an increase of twenty-five basis points 
                                                 
23
 See Appendix B for a discussion of more formally derived size class divisions.  
 
24
 The reported results are for L (the number of lags of the dependent variable) equal to one since additional 
autoregressive terms do not change the primary findings reported here. 
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in the real FFR leads to an annual drop in C&I credit of approximately $5.5 billion, or 
seven percent of 2008 small bank C&I credit to small firms.  Similarly, taking into 
account the autoregressive parameter implies a "total" (two-year) effect of $10 billion or 
nearly thirteen percent.  Welch tests on the FFR coefficients easily reject the null 
hypothesis of equality across each size group. 
Table 2.2. Baseline estimation of equation (2.6).  Robust p-values are reported beneath 
the corresponding coefficient in italics.  Coefficients that are significant at least at the 
10% level are in bold text.  The coefficients on the trend term, as well as the 2008 
dummy are suppressed.   
Panel A - Dependent Variable: SBL1 (Share of C&I Loans to Small Firms)
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th All
Coefficient percentile percentile percentile Banks
FFR -0.291 0.073 -0.117 -0.229
0.000 0.069 0.552 0.001
GDP growth 0.667 0.039 0.238 0.537
0.000 0.596 0.335 0.000
Unemployment -0.439 0.179 -0.418 -0.350
0.002 0.102 0.163 0.005
Liquidity -12.2 0.694 7.26 -11.7
0.000 0.600 0.118 0.000
Baa-Aaa 0.867 0.115 0.450 0.789
0.001 0.446 0.329 0.001
ln(Assets) -2.37 -0.722 -0.430 -2.00
0.000 0.000 0.181 0.000
Net Interest Margin 4.36 -0.448 0.689 3.18
0.001 0.495 0.334 0.005
AR(1) 0.471 0.223 0.183 0.468
0.000 0.000 0.114 0.000
Observations 95299 7996 1724 105019
Wald Statistic 4296.25 214.05 17.58 4334.51
Banks 9720 1308 254 10484
FFRTight -0.326 0.068 -0.163 -0.262
0.000 0.134 0.489 0.000
FFREasy -0.394 0.058 -0.234 -0.327
0.001 0.457 0.444 0.002
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Table 2.2.  (continued) 
Panel B - Dependent Variable: SBL2 (Share of C&I and CRE Loans to Small Firms)
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th All
Coefficient percentile percentile percentile Banks
FFR -0.289 -0.014 -0.150 -0.237
0.000 0.650 0.334 0.000
GDP growth 0.564 0.009 0.018 0.418
0.000 0.853 0.919 0.001
Unemployment -0.440 0.013 -0.448 -0.363
0.001 0.875 0.100 0.002
Liquidity -8.59 0.836 8.57 -8.48
0.000 0.441 0.227 0.000
Baa-Aaa 0.786 0.018 0.554 0.669
0.002 0.880 0.236 0.004
ln(Assets) -1.85 -0.304 -0.694 -1.53
0.000 0.043 0.013 0.000
Net Interest Margin 4.68 0.985 -0.018 3.29
0.000 0.271 0.980 0.001
AR(1) 0.471 0.215 0.156 0.469
0.000 0.000 0.165 0.000
Observations 97388 8187 1768 107343
Wald Statistic 4216.17 253.79 13.78 4266.73
Banks 9851 1331 260 10619
FFRTight -0.312 -0.012 -0.207 -0.254
0.000 0.738 0.263 0.000
FFREasy -0.358 -0.005 -0.301 -0.287
0.001 0.938 0.213 0.003
 
 It is also interesting to investigate whether the balance sheet channel exhibits 
asymmetry across different types of monetary actions.  To accomplish this, I interact the 
measure of monetary policy with dummies indicating whether monetary policy has 
tightened or eased over the prior year.  Though the time dimension is relatively short - ten 
of the years saw tighter monetary policy while six saw easing - the results of these terms 
substituted into the regression are reported at the bottom of each panel of Table 2.2.  The 
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point estimates (which were estimated without restrictions) are larger and estimated more 
precisely for periods of tight monetary policy.  For all cases in which the estimates of 
either FFRTight or FFREasy are statistically significant, I can reject the hypothesis that the 
balance sheet effect observed here is the same across different policy stances at the 5% 
level.  Of course, this result cannot be considered conclusive given the relatively short 
time series used.25 
 The second feature of Table 2.2 that deserves mention is the measures of real 
activity.  The coefficients on forecasts of both GDP and the unemployment rate indicate 
loans to small firms are procyclical.  The positive sign on GDP growth and the negative 
relationship with the unemployment rate are consistent with priors regarding banks’ 
willingness to take on risk in a worsening macroeconomic environment.  Robustness 
checks uphold this conclusion, but occasionally only one measure of real activity 
maintains a standard level of statistical significance.  This result supports the notion that 
banks are forward looking when making loans. 
 In regards to bank liquidity, the negative relationship between liquidity and the 
portion of loans extended to risky borrowers may be a reflection of bank managers’ 
general risk aversion.  Of course, more information on the terms of the loans would be 
needed to make a convincing case that these patterns are in fact a manifestation of risk 
aversion.  Furthermore, the results for liquidity are not particularly robust.  The negative 
coefficient on bank size indicates that the relationship between loans to small businesses 
and bank size exhibited in Table 2.1 persists within size classes.   
                                                 
25
 The question of whether the balance sheet channel exhibits asymmetries across the business cycle is 
taken up in Appendix C. 
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 Finally, the coefficient on the net interest margin has a positive influence on 
investment in small firm loans.  It is conceivable that this represents a means by which 
the balance sheet channel may manifest itself through banks’ balance sheets.  According 
to the theory of the balance sheet channel, monetary policy’s influence on net cash flow 
can worsen balance sheets and hinder access to credit.  It appears that a bank's 
willingness to invest in loans to small firms depends not only on the borrower’s balance 
sheet, but also on the bank's own cash flow.  This fact, in conjunction with the fact that 
the smallest banks are driving the results, leads to the possibility that the effect found 
here can be driven by balance sheet channel effects working on the banks themselves in 
addition to borrowers.  The impact of monetary policy on bank balance sheets and this 
potential for knock-on effects is an area for future research. 
 To help shed some light on the question, however, I consider an alternate division 
of the sample of banks by importance of small business lending to total lending.  A priori, 
one might expect that banks heavily invested in loans to small businesses would exhibit a 
higher sensitivity to monetary tightening since they stand to lose proportionately more.  
Table 2.3 reports the FFR coefficient for those banks that have the highest SBL (top 
quartile) and lowest SBL (bottom quartile) along with median 2008 assets.  The top 
quartile of banks by SBL ratio consists of very small banks, as suggested by Table 2.1.  
On the other hand, median assets for banks in the bottom SBL quartile are (as of 2008) 
less than $260 million.  Even though many banks in this quartile are very small they do 
not exhibit the balance sheet channel effect observed in the top quartile.  This result 
therefore suggests that the dominant effect is a balance sheet effect working on borrowers 
rather than lenders.   
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Table 2.3.  Baseline estimation of equation (2.6) with banks sorted according to their 
proportion of assets invested in C&I loans (SBL1) and C&I plus CRE loans (SBL2).  
Robust p-values are reported beneath the corresponding coefficient in italics.  
Coefficients that are significant at least at the 10% level are in bold text.  All coefficient 
estimates are suppressed except for that of the Federal Funds Rate.  Median assets are 
measured in millions of 2008 dollars. 
Groupings based on importance of small business lending
Top Bottom Top Bottom
Coefficient Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
FFR -0.989 -0.144 -1.420 0.060
0.000 0.278 0.000 0.639
Median assets 74.9 255.4 84.8 207.8
Observations 23699 27285 25797 27326.00
Wald Statistic 2646.71 1170.66 3089.53 1015.21
Banks 6837 5867 6728 5925
Dependent Variable: SBL1 Dependent Variable: SBL2
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 The existence of channels for monetary policy operating beyond the interest-rate 
channel has been reasonably well documented in recent years.  Although the credit 
channel has been singled out as an additional transmission mechanism, the means by 
which it operates have been more difficult to determine.  The evidence presented here 
suggests that a balance sheet channel of monetary policy is in operation and has an 
economically significant impact.  Furthermore, the operation of this mechanism is shown 
irrespective of whether a bank lending channel operates simultaneously.  This 
differentiation is in contrast to previous studies that find support for a credit channel but 
fail to differentiate between the bank lending and balance sheet hypotheses.  The present 
paper also casts a wider net than studies that focus analysis on relatively small samples of 
banks or borrowers from narrowly defined sectors. 
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 This study provides support for the existence of a balance sheet channel that 
works through many different banks' loan books.  Specifically, the smallest ninety 
percent of banks appear to shift their loan portfolios away from small firms in response to 
tighter monetary policy.  Small banks are a major source of credit for small businesses 
and, as these results show, monetary policy has a substantial impact on the willingness of 
small banks to extend this credit.  With respect to the impact on the business cycle, the 
results for the C&I loans in particular are very compelling since C&I loans are used to 
carry inventories and finance investment.  These findings demonstrate a manifestation of 
the types of financial frictions that are assumed by previous studies to generate 
asymmetry in firm spending/investment decisions after a monetary tightening.  Thus, by 
demonstrating banks' movement out of loans to small businesses in response to monetary 
tightening, this paper adds to the growing catalogue of empirical research on monetary 
transmission.   
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CHAPTER III 
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE BANK 
CAPITAL CHANNEL OF 
MONETARY POLICY 
 
1. Introduction 
 Over the last thirty years, the regulation of financial institutions has become an 
increasingly active subject of academic and policy research in the United States.  After 
the 1970s a combination of declining bank capital, macroeconomic weakness, and a 
higher incidence of bank failures triggered a regulatory response that featured explicit 
capital adequacy standards.  In the years since, capital adequacy has been an important 
consideration - if not the centerpiece - of major regulations affecting financial 
intermediaries.26  The recent financial crisis has underscored the importance of prudential 
regulation and sparked renewed interest in the regulation of financial intermediaries.  In a 
striking example of the regulatory response to the crisis, the 111th Congress of the United 
States passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that 
requires the Presidential appointment of a "Vice Chairman for Supervision" to serve on 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act amends the 
Federal Reserve Act to explicitly ensure that, "The Board of Governors may not delegate 
. . . its functions for the establishment of policies for the supervision and regulation of . . . 
financial firms."  This type of legislation serves to strengthen the link between the 
                                                 
26
 See Wall and Peterson (1996) for a good summary of major changes to capital regulations through the 
publication date. 
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regulatory and stabilization functions of the Federal Reserve.  One goal of this study is to 
investigate this link between the Federal Reserve's dual responsibilities of monetary 
policy and prudential regulation. 
 The implications for the monetary/regulatory link presented here, however, are a 
consequence of the primary goal of this paper: to further define the role of banks in the 
transmission of monetary policy.  Recently, the credit channel view has been developed 
and tested to show that the role of financial frictions in the transmission of monetary 
policy to the real economy is nontrivial (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988; Bernanke, Gertler, & 
Gilchrist, 1996).  Conspicuously absent from the recent work in theories of monetary 
transmission, though, is an explicit role for bank equity (Van den Heuvel, 2009; 
Friedman, 1991).  This paper focuses on empirically demonstrating a recently described 
transmission mechanism known as the bank capital channel, which depends critically on 
bank equity.27  Van den Heuvel (2009) constructs a dynamic model in which bank 
lending decisions are influenced by their current and expected capital positions.  If a 
monetary tightening adversely impacts banks' capital adequacy, this might lead to a 
reduction in credit extension.  Since there is no explicit role for bank deposits in the 
model, this transmission mechanism falls outside of the more familiar bank lending 
channel.   
 By examining the uneven distribution of monetary policy actions, this paper 
builds on previous explorations of the link between banks, capital, and the real economy 
which began in earnest during the 1990-91 recession.  The Federal Reserve's dual role as 
a monetary authority and banking regulator necessitates a keen interest in these studies.  
                                                 
27
 I will use the terms equity and capital interchangeably except where explicitly noted. 
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Indeed, much of the early work in this area was produced by the Federal Reserve’s 
staff.28  In an early exposition of the role of capital in the 1990-91 recession, Syron 
(1991) characterizes the apparent decrease in the supply of bank credit during the 1990-
91 recession as a “capital crunch.”  In his view, the reduction in the supply of credit was a 
uniquely capital issue.  As evidence for this, he points to the unusual reduction of 
dividends as well as the outsized capital losses in the Northeast region (which 
experienced especially tight credit standards).  Bernanke and Lown (1991) perform more 
rigorous tests of this hypothesis and find support for Syron’s capital crunch.  Unlike 
Syron, however, Bernanke and Lown entertain – and find support for – the idea that 
changes in bank regulation may have contributed to the capital crunch.  Separately, 
Furlong (1992) finds that bank leverage ratios predict loan growth when controlling for 
other supply and demand factors.  These findings – in conjunction with anecdotal reports 
– marked the beginning of an empirical literature that examines the link between the 
credit crunch of the 1990-91 recession and the risk-based capital requirements 
implemented by the Basel Accord.29   
 Shrieves and Dahl (1995) provide evidence that capital considerations and 
changing regulatory conditions were responsible for the lending slowdown that occurred 
during the implementation of the Basel Accord.  Thakor (1996) finds that borrowers see 
abnormal increases in their stock prices if they are able to secure a loan from a bank 
subject to risk based capital requirements.  This positive reaction is even greater if the 
bank is more capital constrained, which is consistent with the notion that capital 
                                                 
28
 See, for instance, Syron (1991), Furlong (1992), Baer and McElravey (1993), and Wall and Peterson 
(1996). 
 
29
 Both the senior loan officer survey (Dec 1989) and the American Bankers Association survey (Jan 1992) 
contain anecdotal evidence of a change in bank behavior in response to Basel. 
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considerations can play an important role in credit extension.  Other studies such as Peek 
and Rosengren (1995) and Baer and McElravey (1993) present evidence consistent with a 
capital crunch following the implementation of capital adequacy requirements.  
Alternatively, Berger and Udell (1994) find evidence that capital plays a part in bank 
behavior, but downplay the role of new capital regulations. 
 These studies do not, however, test how monetary policy affects bank loan growth 
for a given capital position.  For the purposes of the present study though, this body of 
literature studying the link between changing regulatory conditions and bank asset 
management is important for several reasons.  First, a significant amount of evidence is 
provided to support the hypothesis that bank behavior changes in response to fluctuations 
in capital and capital adequacy.  Specifically, it appears that low levels of capital 
adequacy may be associated with a reduction in the supply of credit.  As suggested by the 
capital channel, the link between bank equity and the real economy may thus be an 
important one.  Secondly, the studies detail the significant changes in regulatory capital 
requirements during the 1980s and early 1990s.30  Since it appears that the impact of bank 
capital may have been changing dramatically with the regulatory requirements, the 
empirics presented here will focus on the period following the announcement of the Basel 
I Accord and the FDICIA.  Finally, this literature draws a distinction between lending 
effects generated by capital and those generated by a drawdown of deposits as in the bank 
lending channel.  In this way, this strand of literature lays the foundation for a channel of 
monetary transmission that works through bank balance sheets alongside the credit 
channel. 
                                                 
30
 For a summary of regulatory changes see Baer and McElravey (1993) and Wall and Peterson (1996). 
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 While the effects of capital on lending may be debated in a regulatory 
environment that lacks capital adequacy standards, the theory linking lending and capital 
in the presence of capital regulations is stronger.  In the extreme case, a bank facing a 
binding capital requirement would be prohibited from expanding assets and/or loans if it 
cannot easily issue equity.  Additionally, risk-based capital requirements (such as those 
established in the Basel Accord) effectively act as a tax that is larger on assets carrying 
higher risk weights.  Banks would be expected to substitute out of risky assets (such as 
commercial loans) and into safer assets with low risk weights.  Essentially, risk weighted 
capital standards restrict lending in a similar way to some restrictive covenants in debt 
contracts. 
 In Van den Heuvel (2009), the author constructs a dynamic model that 
incorporates risk-based capital requirements and an imperfect market for bank equity.31  
The former assumption is manifested in regulations such as the Basel accord, while the 
latter is supported by a lemons premium generated by asymmetric information (Stein, 
1998).  Empirically, Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that issuing new equity results in a 
sizable dilution of current equity.  The large cost associated with raising equity therefore 
limits a bank’s ability and willingness to augment its capital via share offerings.  
Furthermore, companies are much more reluctant to cut dividends than to increase them.   
 As a result of the aforementioned assumptions, the model shows that it may be 
optimal for a low-capital bank to forego profitable lending opportunities even if capital 
regulations are not momentarily binding.  The reason for this is that banks wish to lower 
                                                 
31
 Although I summarize the model here and below, I refer the reader to Van den Heuvel (2009) for the 
formal presentation.  Additional features and implications of the model will be mentioned as warranted 
throughout the paper. 
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the potential for current and/or future regulatory violations.  Thus, any negative shock to 
a bank’s current or expected future capital position could lead to tighter credit.  It is this 
aspect of the model in which capital enters as a transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy.  A monetary tightening raises short-term interest rates that – along with the asset 
transformation service performed by banks – leads to lower retained earnings and, thus, 
capital.  This impact of monetary policy on bank loans works through bank equity and is 
therefore referred to by Van den Heuvel (2002a, 2009) as “the bank capital channel.”  In 
a sense, the bank capital channel can be thought of as a shift in the supply of credit 
resulting from the balance sheet channel (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995) working on lenders 
subject to capital adequacy regulations.32 
 Despite the demonstrated importance of bank capital, empirical tests of the capital 
channel have been scarce.  Among the studies that have been conducted, Van den Heuvel 
(2002b) uses state-level data to show that output growth in states with poorly capitalized 
banks is more sensitive to changes in monetary policy.  After controlling for the bank 
lending channel by including measures of bank liquidity, this evidence is consistent with 
a bank capital channel for monetary policy.  In a subsequent paper, Van den Heuvel 
(2007) uses bank-level data to obtain a similar conclusion.  Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia 
(2002) use a matched sample of lenders and borrowers to show that banks with low 
capital appear to reduce loan supply disproportionately during monetary contractions - a 
result consistent with the capital channel.  It is worth emphasizing, however, that the 
bank lending channel (in conjunction with a failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem) 
                                                 
32
 I should note that the model detailed in Van den Heuvel (2009) implies that any negative profit shock – 
not just one brought on by a monetary tightening – should have detrimental effects on loan supply for those 
banks concerned about their current or future capital position. 
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also predicts that poorly capitalized banks will exhibit increased lending sensitivity in 
response to monetary tightening.  This result arises as banks attempt to raise funds to 
offset a fall in reserves induced by the monetary authority.  Those banks with higher 
levels of capital will be faced with lower asymmetric information costs when attempting 
to issue, for instance, large denomination time deposits.  This effect somewhat 
equivocates the findings in several of the papers mentioned above. 
 Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006) present evidence that the strength of a bank’s 
lending response to monetary policy varies inversely with capital adequacy.  Although 
the authors interpret their findings in the context of the bank lending channel, the results 
are consistent with the implications of the capital channel.  These studies help to 
illuminate the connection between regulatory and monetary responsibilities highlighted in 
this paper.  Finally, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) use an empirical strategy similar to 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) to find that the lending response of Italian banks to monetary 
policy depends critically on capital adequacy considerations in a manner consistent with 
the capital channel.  Importantly, the authors cleverly control for the dependence of the 
bank lending channel on banks' capital position described above.   
 This paper contributes to the aforementioned literature in several ways.  First, I 
estimate the loan supply using disaggregate data rather than simple aggregates.  Besides 
serving to deepen the identification strategies, bank-level data are more useful for 
identifying the types of banks important to the operation of the capital channel.  Second, 
as formulated in Van den Heuvel (2009), the model predicting a capital channel has 
several implications.  By presenting results consistent with two separate implications of 
the capital channel, I am able to limit the interpretation of the findings.  Third, I attempt 
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to adequately control for credit channel effects that might otherwise obfuscate the 
interpretation of the results.  Fourth, I discuss the likely impact of several recent 
regulatory proposals on the operation of the capital channel.  Finally, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2004) point out that the link between bank capital and risk taking behavior 
(including lending decisions) is still controversial.  This paper provides evidence to help 
clarify this debate by reporting results consistent with a capital channel - a potential 
monetary transmission mechanism which has remained largely unexplored.   
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the primary 
data used throughout the paper.  Section 3 discusses empirical tests constructed to 
identify the capital channel and presents results.  Section 4 presents several policy 
considerations and concludes.  
 
2. Data 
 The primary data used in this study are taken from the Report of Condition and 
Income data collected by the FFIEC.  These data (also known as the Call Reports) are 
sampled on a yearly basis for all individual banks regulated by the Federal Reserve 
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.  
Given the significant changes in prudential regulation in the 1980s, obtaining a currently 
meaningful relationship between lending and capital should focus on the period after the 
announcement of significant legislation impacting this relationship.  I follow Kishan and 
Opiela (2006) and begin my sample in the third quarter of 1990, a date by which all parts 
of both the FDICIA and Basel Accord were either announced or enacted.  Using this start 
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date excludes years in which capital regulations and their enforcement were in a state of 
flux while also including the variation associated with 1990-91 recession. 
 Several criteria are used to remove banks with limited presence or relevance in 
the data.  First, bank-quarters are dropped if the institution reports no assets, equity, or 
loans.  Secondly, any institution reporting for less than two years is dropped along with 
any institution that does not report continuously between the time it enters and exits the 
sample.  Finally, all Edge Act corporations are excluded from the sample.  Applying 
these filters to Call Reports between 1990Q3 and 2008Q3 yields a panel of 190,181 bank 
years.  Dropping bank years containing a merger (as in Kashyap & Stein, 2000) has a 
negligible effect on the results reported in Section 3, so these observations are included. 
 Summary statistics for the beginning and end of the sample are reported in Table 
3.1.33  Given the potential for capital effects to differ across size classes (Bernanke & 
Lown, 1991; Kishan & Opiela, 2000, 2006; Van den Heuvel, 2007) these data are 
summarized by size groups.  Several patterns exhibited in Table 3.1 are worth 
mentioning.  First, small banks are much more liquid than large banks.  In addition, over 
the course of the sample, small banks tend to hold more capital per dollar of assets than 
large banks.  Looking at changes over time, one can see that the skewness of market 
share (as measured by assets) has increased during the sample.  Furthermore, the smallest 
98% of banks have increased their investment in loans, mostly at the expense of liquid 
securities.  Presumably, at least part of this shift is due to the increase in liquidity of loans 
themselves during the sample as well as the housing bubble.  The housing bubble also 
                                                 
33
 Although the data run through 2008, statistics are reported as of 2007.  The hope is to give the reader a 
sense of the predominant changes over the sample period without introducing noise from the financial 
crisis.  I should also note that excluding 2008 from the sample does not materially impact the findings 
reported in section III. 
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helped crowd out C&I loans between 1990 and 2007.34  Finally, small banks have come 
to finance a much larger percentage of their assets with large denomination time deposits 
than do large banks.  This could indicate that small banks have a more difficult time 
raising equity, as one might expect. 
 It should be noted that (even with the benefit of these descriptive statistics) it is 
unclear a priori whether one should expect the capital channel to be more or less 
prominent in large banks.  Large banks hold less equity, presumably because of their 
lower non-leverage risks such as diversification.  This fact might lead to a stronger 
capital channel since a given shock to capital would be more likely to put large 
institutions in danger of facing regulatory penalties.  However, as mentioned earlier, it is 
generally easier for large banks to issue equity (or equity substitutes like subordinated 
debt) when the need arises.  Additionally, it is easier for large banks to hedge interest rate 
risk, which would further dampen any capital channel.  Therefore the question of whether 
large or small banks experience a stronger capital channel effect is ultimately an 
empirical one.  There is currently a conflict in the literature regarding this question.  Van 
den Heuvel (2007) finds that the capital channel is not operative in small banks, while the 
results presented in Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli 
(2004) indicate that capital channel type effects are stronger in small banks. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Indeed, the data show that real estate loans as a percent of total loans increased during the sample period 
by 21 percentage points for small banks, 19 for medium sized banks, and 15 points for large banks. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for key variables by bank size (grouped by percentile 
ranks). 
Balance sheet characteristics by size class
< 90th 
percentile
90th - 98th
percentile
> 98th 
percentile
As of 1990 Q3
Median Assets (Millions of 2007 $) $65.99 $717.65 $7,335.67
Securities / Assets 0.29 0.20 0.14
Loans / Assets 0.56 0.65 0.64
C&I Loans / Loans 0.20 0.21 0.32
Large Time Deposits / Assets 0.11 0.12 0.11
Median Capital/Assets % 8.5% 7.2% 6.1%
% of System-wide Assets 18.8% 17.1% 64.1%
As of 2007 Q4
Median Assets (Millions of $) $113.91 $1,208.90 $10,310.38
Securities / Assets 0.19 0.17 0.15
Loans / Assets 0.70 0.72 0.56
C&I Loans / Loans 0.14 0.17 0.22
Large Time Deposits / Assets 0.17 0.14 0.08
Median Capital/Assets % 10.2% 9.5% 10.0%
% of System-wide Assets 10.5% 8.5% 81.0%
 
 
3. Methods and Results 
 Before introducing the empirical tests of the capital channel, it is useful to 
summarize the theoretical model of Van den Heuvel (2007) in which monetary policy 
impacts bank lending via its influence on bank capital.  In this model, banks maximize 
shareholder value each period by choosing the desired amount of new loans, marketable 
securities, and dividend payments.  Each bank faces capital requirements similar to those 
imposed in the Basel Accord, an imperfect market for its equity, and uncertainty 
regarding the fraction of loans that default each period. 
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 Finally, it is assumed that banks finance some portion of their assets with debt 
(including deposits) at a cost influenced by the short-term interest rate.  The monetary 
authority's influence over the short rate - in conjunction with banks' maturity 
transformation function - implies that monetary policy actions influence bank profits.  If 
banks cannot substantially lower dividends, lower profits resulting from a monetary 
tightening will reduce bank capital over time.  Facing lower levels of equity, the bank 
will restrict lending because of capital requirements and the high cost of issuing new 
equity.  Since the model is constructed in a dynamic setting, momentarily binding capital 
requirements are not necessary for banks to forgo profitable lending opportunities if they 
are concerned about the possibility of future capital adequacy violations. 
 Tests of the capital channel - which may operate alongside the standard interest 
rate channel of monetary policy - are described below in Sections 3.1a and 3.2a. 
 
3.1a. Methods: "One-Step" Approach 
 As a first test of the capital channel I use the framework outlined in Kashyap and 
Stein (2000).  To form a testable hypothesis, I consider how two banks with different 
capital positions respond to monetary policy shocks.  Suppose two banks differ only with 
respect to their capital adequacy.  If each is faced with a contractionary monetary shock, 
both banks’ asset transformation business will be less profitable as net interest margins 
are compressed.  Each bank will then realize lower retained earnings and capital vis-à-vis 
a state with no short-term rate increase.  Since they are both subject to capital adequacy 
regulations and consequences of violation, the bank with the lower capital position has 
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more reason to be concerned about a current and/or future regulatory violation.  
Therefore, the managers of a bank in a worse capital position would be more likely to 
shrink their loan portfolio (or grow it less quickly) in response to a monetary policy 
shock.   
 The testable implication is 2 / 0,it it tL C MPδ δ δ > where L is a bank-level measure 
of lending activity, C is the bank-level capital-asset ratio, and MP is a measure of 
monetary policy measured such that higher values are associated with tighter policy.  The 
cross-sectional derivative /it itL Cδ δ  captures the degree to which lending is capital 
constrained at any time t.  The hypothesis is that this constraint is intensified during 
monetary contractions.  Alternatively, taking the time series derivative first it is 
hypothesized that /it tL MPδ δ - the sensitivity of lending volume to monetary policy for 
bank i - is greater for banks with a weaker capital position.  That is, loan growth 
following a monetary contraction should fall by more as capital decreases. 
 Of course, other channels of monetary policy can be influenced by capital as well.  
Specifically, the strength of the bank lending channel (BLC) should depend on capital.  
Since an economically meaningful BLC hinges on banks’ inability to raise non-
reservable liabilities as reserves are withdrawn, the BLC depends on banks’ access to 
funding markets.  Banks that are less leveraged (i.e. those with a higher capital asset 
ratio) should be able to replace the lost deposits more easily.  As such, banks with more 
capital should experience a smaller BLC as well as a smaller capital channel.  This 
observation highlights the necessity for a good control for the BLC.  Any coefficient on 
capital in a regression excluding a BLC control variable will produce dubious results due 
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to omitted variable bias.  Adding a good control for the BLC is required to avoid this 
alternate interpretation. 
 With this in mind, I test the hypothesis above using a regression analogous to 
Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) “One-Step” approach: 
 
[ ]
[ ]
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 (3.1)  
with i = 1, . . ., N (N = number of banks) and t = 1, . . ., T (t = year) and where: 
Lit commercial and industrial (C&I) loans of bank i in year t, 
MPt monetary policy indicator, 
Cit-1 capital-asset ratio of bank i, 
Dit-1 measure of bank deposits, 
Фit control variables. 
 
 When measuring the response of lending to monetary policy, it is not uncommon 
to focus on C&I loans.  This is because C&I lending is often uncollateralized and of 
relatively short maturity.  Furthermore, under risk-based-capital regulatory regimes C&I 
loans carry a high risk-weight.  These features make C&I loans likely to be more 
responsive to monetary policy changes than other types of loans.  To measure monetary 
policy, I use the Bernanke-Mihov (1998) indicator multiplied by negative one so that a 
positive change indicates tighter policy.   
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 The primary indicator of capital adequacy, Cit-1, is a standard leverage ratio 
defined as the ratio of bank capital to assets normalized by the mean over the entire 
sample.  This measure is preferred for several reasons.  First, it explicitly appears in 
capital regulations in the United States and is used by regulators to help determine the 
degree of a bank’s capital adequacy.  Second, as Shrieves and Dahl (1995) note, it 
appears that the leverage ratio (vis-à-vis other capital adequacy measures) is the primary 
driver of bank behavior.  Finally, Estrella, Park, and Peristiani (2000) report that simple 
leverage ratios are as good as Basel-style risk-weighted capital ratios in predicting short 
run failure.  Dit-1 measures bank level demand deposits.  Note that - as is common 
practice - all bank-specific controls are lagged one period to avoid endogeneity issues. 
 The set of control variables itΦ  includes real GDP growth and CPI-based 
inflation to help capture cyclical movements and loan demand effects.  Also included in 
the set of controls is a measure of bank liquidity, defined as securities plus federal funds 
sold to total assets, and an indicator of bank size given by the log of total assets.  The size 
control is normalized with respect to the mean in each year as in Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2004) to remove trends in size.  Finally, the liquidity indicator is normalized by 
the mean over the entire sample.  Additional controls include a financial crisis dummy 
and a dummy indicating whether or not a bank is critically undercapitalized.   
 To reiterate, I choose to use annual data to estimate (3.1).  The reasons for doing 
so are similar to those discussed in Ashcraft (2006).  Equation (3.1) is estimated using the 
GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which is preferred given this 
dynamic panel.  This method ensures efficiency and consistency provided that the model 
is not subject to serial correlation of order two or higher and that the instruments used are 
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valid.  Furthermore, with the sample period used here, computational memory limitations 
preclude the estimation of (3.1) with quarterly data unless one wishes to either sacrifice a 
significant number of covariates, dramatically reduce the number of instruments used, or 
both.  Additionally, it is worth pointing out that the failure to estimate equations similar 
to (3.1) with dynamic panel estimators represents a deficiency of some previous 
empirical studies of the capital channel.  Additionally, high-frequency observations of 
bank-level lending activity can produce counterintuitive results owing to factors beyond 
the bank’s control.   
 Before presenting the results, I note that testing the null hypothesis that monetary 
policy effects are equal across banks with varying degrees of capital adequacy is 
equivalent to testing the significance of the δ  coefficient.  I control for the BLC effects 
described above by including deposit growth, the interaction of deposit growth with 
monetary policy, and bank capital.  In addition, the bank liquidity regressor provides 
another measure of BLC control.  This is because (as outlined in Kashyap & Stein, 2000) 
banks with a high degree of liquidity have a built-in shock absorber between lower 
reserves and loans. 
  
3.1b. Results: "One-Step" Approach 
 Table 3.2 summarizes the key coefficient estimates from (3.1) for each size 
class.35  As expected, tighter monetary policy is associated with a decrease in C&I 
lending for the smallest ninety percent of banks.  The degree to which lending is capital 
                                                 
35
 The coefficients reported are the "long-run" values, and the associated p-values are computed using the 
delta method. 
 47 
 
 
constrained is displayed in the second line of coefficient estimates.  The third line of 
estimates in Table 3.2 reports the estimate of δ .  A significantly positive value of this 
coefficient implies that lending of banks with a weak capital position exhibits a greater 
sensitivity to monetary policy - just as predicted by the capital channel.  Next, the 
coefficients for the bank lending channel are reported.  Neither of the deposit measures 
are significantly different from zero, but lending growth is positively related to bank-
level liquidity as in Kashyap and Stein (2000).36   
 For larger banks, the significance of the capital channel coefficient evaporates.  
This distributional asymmetry across bank sizes is consistent with the findings of Kishan 
and Opiela (2000).  In their study, the authors perform a test of bank sensitivity to 
monetary actions based on capital adequacy and find capital considerations appear to 
influence the lending behavior of small banks only.  However, these findings are contrary 
to Van den Heuvel’s (2007) study wherein he finds that the capital channel works mostly 
through large financial intermediaries.  Finally, the macroeconomic/loan demand controls 
each show a significant impact on loan growth. 
 For the real economy, this distributional effect can have important implications 
since small banks tend to lend to small businesses that are hotbeds of process and product 
innovations.  In fact, the loans of small banks are sometimes referred to as “high 
powered” loans (Hancock & Wilcox, 1998) because a dollar decline in small bank loans 
has a larger economic impact than an equivalent decline in large bank loans.  Another 
important implication of this distributional asymmetry is that commercial loans to small 
                                                 
36
 For robustness, large denomination time deposits were used in place of demand deposits.  This yielded 
significance of the deposits measure at the 10% level, and all other coefficients were very similar to those 
reported in Table 2. 
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bank customers - mostly small firms - decline disproportionately as a result of capital 
considerations.  If these small borrowers face switching costs, they are likely to bear the 
largest burden of the capital channel in times of tight monetary policy.   
Table 3.2. Baseline estimation of equation (3.1).  Robust p-values are reported beneath 
the corresponding coefficient in italics.  Coefficients that are significant at least at the 
10% level are in bold text.  The dummy identifying critically undercapitalized banks and 
the financial crisis dummy are suppressed.   
All
Banks
< 90th 
percentile
90th - 98th
percentile
> 98th 
percentile
∆MP t -0.144 -0.152 -0.021 -0.022
0.000 0.000 0.573 0.879
C t-1 0.632 0.925 0.729 -0.255
0.001 0.001 0.540 0.796
C t-1∆MP t 1.948 2.413 -0.888 -2.925
0.002 0.002 0.791 0.483
D t-1 1.332 1.358 0.929 1.083
0.731 0.731 0.637 0.264
D t-1∆MP t -0.776 -0.700 -0.755 -0.765
0.779 0.779 0.069 0.360
Liquidity t-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.013
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(Assets t-1 ) -0.083 -0.043 -0.326 -0.420
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GDP t 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.016
0.072 0.072 0.009 0.016
CPI t 0.004 0.003 0.020 0.039
0.815 0.815 0.016 0.051
Observations 136,896 123,825 10,410 2,661
MA(2) 0.33 0.15 0.23 0.13
Wald Stat 2,682 2,138 365 175
Dependent Variable: C&I Loan Growth
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3.2a. Methods: Interest Rate Risk Approach 
 As a final test, I attempt to identify a prediction that is more unique to the capital 
channel.  The capital channel hinges crucially on the asset transformation function of 
banks.  If a bank's liabilities reprice more quickly than its assets, a monetary policy 
tightening will lead to a margin compression as banks pay more for their short term 
financing both now and in the future.  In addition, if a bank is marking assets and 
liabilities to market, an increase in interest rates will lead to a larger fall in the value of 
the longer-dated assets.  As a matter of accounting, this would erode bank equity.  In this 
way, a monetary tightening impacts bank profits and capital positions.  Furthermore, this 
tightening increases the chances that a bank may violate regulatory capital requirements 
in the future.  Thus, the capital channel should exist even for banks that do not find the 
capital requirement momentarily binding. 
 Identifying the capital channel along the lines of the strategy outlined above 
requires a measure of the sensitivity of bank assets relative to liabilities.  Though it would 
be ideal to obtain the weighted average duration of a bank's assets and liabilities 
measured in each period, this information is not publicly disclosed for most banks.  
However, a good proxy for weighted average duration is weighted average maturity.  
Subtracting the average maturity of liabilities from the average maturity of assets to 
produce a "maturity gap" measures the extent to which a bank engages in asset 
transformation.  The capital of a bank with a large maturity gap would be expected to 
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suffer more from a monetary tightening since a large maturity gap indicates assets reprice 
much less frequently than liabilities.37   
 Beginning in 2006, it is possible to extract maturity information for most assets 
and liabilities from the memoranda of the Call Reports.  From this, I use a cross-sectional 
regression to predict a bank's maturity gap based on bank-level characteristics observable 
throughout the sample.  Regressors can include organization type and balance sheet 
information such as the ratio of real estate loans to assets, the ratio of deposits to total 
liabilities, etc.38  The coefficients on each of the regressors are very stable across quarters 
over which the regression can be run, though there is no guarantee that this method 
predicts the maturity gap for the entire sample period with a high degree of accuracy.  
Mitigating this concern, however, is that the method described below requires only that 
the relative maturity gaps are predicted to a reasonable degree.  For this purpose, it is 
much easier to have confidence in the "maturity gap prediction" approach.  For instance, 
a negative coefficient on the amount of deposit-based finance and a positive coefficient 
on real estate loans will at least yield a consistent ordering (if not the actual maturity 
gap). 
 I then test for the capital channel using a method similar to Kishan and Opiela 
(2000) by running the following regression on subsets of banks grouped by maturity gap: 
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37
 In addition, maturity is closely correlated with duration.  Thus, besides providing insight into net interest 
margin effects, the maturity gap is also a good measure of interest rate risk. 
 
38
 The reader is referred to Appendix D for a more detailed treatment of the maturity gap regressions. 
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with all variables as defined previously.  Sorting banks by the maturity gap is equivalent 
to sorting based on the cost a bank bears as a result of tighter monetary policy owing to 
its maturity transformation function.  In response to tighter monetary policy, banks with 
higher maturity gaps are expected to face increased deterioration in current and future 
capital positions.  Thus, as a result of the capital channel, banks with a high maturity gap 
would be expected to have a lower β  (higher in absolute value) than those banks with a 
comparatively low degree of maturity transformation. 
 
3.2b. Results: Interest Rate Risk Approach 
 Table 3.3 reports selected long-run coefficients from the estimation of (3.2) for 
commercial banks organized as stock corporations within each size class.39  The first 
column of Panel A shows that - after controlling for credit channel and demand effects - 
those banks with the lowest maturity gaps (< 10th percentile) respond about half as 
forcefully to monetary policy than those banks with the highest maturity gaps (sixth 
column).  Looking at the second and fifth columns, the results are just what one would 
expect if the capital channel is operative among these banks.  With less margin 
compression and interest rate risk than the top decile, the banks with a top quartile 
maturity gap (fifth column) experience a weaker response to monetary policy on average.  
Finally, the monotonicity is violated by the above- and below-median cohorts, but a 
portion of this small difference is due to the slightly different AR(1) terms used to 
calculate the long-run coefficients.  I should also note that the point estimates reported in 
                                                 
39
 The results are robust to including banks with different organization structures, such as mutuals and 
cooperatives.  However, mutuals and cooperatives are not distributed evenly across maturity gap cohorts, 
and for this reason they are excluded from the representative results of Table 3.3. 
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the first row are all statistically different from their "matched" counterparts.  Looking at 
Panel B, a similar pattern exists for the smallest bank group, as expected.  All of these 
results are robust to the inclusion of other controls, such as the change in large time 
deposits and alternate specifications of the maturity gap regression. 
 Two important questions remain.  The first is whether higher maturity gaps might 
correlate with other bank-level characteristics that would lead one to expect a greater 
sensitivity to monetary policy.  Though I control for several characteristics known to be 
associated with sensitivity to monetary policy, it is worth noting that high-maturity-gap 
banks are both larger and more liquid.  It has been shown that smaller banks exhibit a 
stronger credit channel.40  Furthermore, as demonstrated in Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
banks with greater liquidity exhibit a lower sensitivity to monetary policy actions owing 
to a reduced BLC.  Therefore, it appears that the maturity gap cohorts tend to be 
associated with bank-level characteristics that would bias against the detection of a 
capital channel.  I should also note that the results reported here are not materially altered 
if regressions include thrifts that file Call Reports.  However, many state chartered 
savings banks have very high maturity gaps and are over-represented in the top maturity 
gap decile when these institutions are included.  Finally, different maturity gap cohorts do 
not give rise to geographic distributional anomalies – another potential concern. 
 
 
                                                 
40
 See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006), and Kandrac (2011) for 
examples. 
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Table 3.3. Baseline estimation of equation (3.2).  Robust p-values are reported beneath 
the corresponding coefficient in italics.  Coefficients that are significant at least at the 
10% level are in bold text.  Other coefficients described in equation (3.2) are suppressed.   
Panel A (All Bank Sizes)
< 10th < 25th < 50th > 50th > 75th > 90th
∆MP t -0.128 -0.133 -0.129 -0.184 -0.171 -0.246
0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
C t-1 0.672 1.438 1.491 -0.369 -0.466 -0.844
0.308 0.001 0.001 0.250 0.260 0.137
C t-1∆MP t 2.522 2.501 2.440 0.932 -0.533 -1.311
0.216 0.055 0.011 0.446 0.671 0.460
Panel B (Bank size < 90th percentile)
< 10th < 25th < 50th > 50th > 75th > 90th
∆MP t -0.125 -0.138 -0.125 -0.196 -0.192 -0.206
0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022
C t-1 -0.108 0.647 1.304 0.254 0.018 0.004
0.895 0.218 0.001 0.501 0.960 0.997
C t-1∆MP t 3.195 2.991 2.672 2.044 2.044 -0.125
0.149 0.044 0.012 0.044 0.062 0.942
Panel C (Bank size 90th - 98th percentile)
< 10th < 25th < 50th > 50th > 75th > 90th
∆MP t -0.093 -0.035 0.005 -0.047 -0.183 0.227
0.330 0.631 0.946 0.584 0.164 0.804
C t-1 2.139 1.324 1.273 -0.816 -1.032 1.479
0.162 0.305 0.167 0.468 0.494 0.847
C t-1∆MP t -5.439 3.203 0.960 -6.838 -7.326 -6.978
0.016 0.363 0.796 0.103 0.188 0.909
Maturity gap percentile
Maturity gap percentile
Maturity gap percentile
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Table 3.3. (continued) 
Panel D (Bank size > 98th percentile)
< 10th < 25th < 50th > 50th > 75th > 90th
∆MP t 0.562 0.355 0.147 -0.199 -0.417 0.211
0.647 0.345 0.460 0.287 0.034 0.883
C t-1 -0.316 -2.641 -1.746 0.564 0.062 1.427
0.976 0.005 0.131 0.659 0.968 0.980
C t-1∆MP t -5.653 -4.465 -3.964 -4.720 -12.031 4.734
0.848 0.332 0.356 0.492 0.016 0.885
Maturity gap percentile
 
 The second important question concerns the economic importance of the high-
maturity-gap banks relative to their low-maturity-gap counterparts.  Although I find 
strong evidence in favor of the capital channel, the quantitative significance is less 
certain.  While it might be preferable to evaluate the strength of the capital channel by 
estimating a fully specified structural model (that also includes the interest rate and credit 
channels) and then simulating the impact of monetary policy, no such model exists.  
However, using the estimates presented in this paper may be instructive.  Considering the 
smallest ninety percent of banks, coefficient estimates from Table 3.3 imply that just a 
one standard deviation increase in the monetary policy indicator would cause banks with 
above-median maturity gaps to reduce their stock of C&I lending by about 3%.  This 
reaction is 57% stronger than the low-maturity-gap banks. 
 Finally, comparing the results from Panel B with those in Panels C and D 
provides further evidence that the bank capital channel of monetary policy works 
primarily through small lenders.  The largest ten percent of banks do not appear to 
respond to changes in monetary policy given the controls in Φ , many of which typically 
have a statistically significant influence on lending behavior. 
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4. Conclusions 
 The "capital channel" of monetary policy describes yet another means by which 
monetary policy can impact credit supply and, thus, the real economy.  This channel 
recognizes that tighter policy leads to deterioration in banks' current and future capital 
positions.  In the presence of regulatory capital requirements, the capital channel predicts 
that banks respond to capital deterioration by decreasing new loan supply.  Though the 
capital channel explains how financial frictions impact lending, it differs from the bank 
lending channel in that there is no explicit role for reserves.   
 This paper presents two empirical tests consistent with a capital channel working 
through the smallest ninety percent of banks.  First, loan growth of banks with higher 
levels of capital adequacy responds less dramatically to changes in the stance of 
monetary policy after controlling for indicators of the bank lending channel.  Second, 
those banks with current and future capital positions that are most sensitive to changes in 
interest rates tend to contract lending more in response to a monetary tightening.   
 Besides documenting a relatively unstudied transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, the results of this paper have important implications for recent financial reform 
proposals - many of which have been taken up by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.  First, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an update to FAS 
#157 in 2009 that somewhat eases mark-to-market rules for banks.  The decreased use of 
mark-to-market accounting rules - which require banks to report certain assets and 
liabilities at a fair market value - would soften blows to bank capital due to interest rate 
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risk.  This would likely mitigate the capital channel somewhat.  However, banks’ 
repricing risk would still be present and a change in the stance of monetary policy could 
still lead to a change in net interest margin, impacting future realizations of capital 
adequacy.  Essentially, dropping mark-to-market rules eases capital constraints since it 
decreases the chances that a bank will find itself in technical violation of capital adequacy 
requirements.  At the same time, the decreased transparency associated with such a 
change may increase the lemons premium creditors and investors attach to external funds.  
Banks could then find it more difficult to raise non-reservable liabilities and equity, 
strengthening the bank lending channel as well as the capital channel. 
 Second, there has been increased interest in contingent capital requirements for 
banks.  Contingent capital is in effect a convertible bond that converts into equity if 
capital ratios fall below a certain level.  The effect of such a requirement would most 
likely weaken the capital channel.  The contingent capital securities act as built-in shock 
absorbers to bank capital positions, decreasing the likelihood of capital adequacy 
violations and the associated penalties.  If monetary policy eases, the increased cost 
associated with acquiring contingent capital will depress retained earnings, limiting the 
growth of lending as capital expands at a slower rate.  However, banks may face a strong 
incentive to avoid triggering such a conversion as it may incite a creditor panic.  In this 
way, strong self-imposed capital requirements could mean that contingent capital 
requirements would have a negligible impact on the capital channel. 
 Third, there has been a renewed interest in countercyclical capital requirements, 
ultimately resulting in their inclusion in Basel III.  Under a regulatory regime with 
countercyclical capital requirements, mandatory capital-to-asset ratios increase during 
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expansions and decrease during recessions.  The goal of such a regime is to force banks 
to accumulate capital during cyclical expansions that will make them less likely to face 
solvency issues during a downturn.  As the economy weakens banks experience lower 
capital-asset ratios as delinquencies and defaults increase and cash flows decrease or 
become negative.  Facing such a situation, banks might contract loan supply to shore up 
their balance sheets.  Given the potential for a feedback loop to weaken the economy 
further, countercyclical capital ratios attempt to ease the burden on banks by decreasing 
the capital banks are required to hold during these periods.  Leaving aside the difficulties 
associated with determining when capital ratios should increase or decrease, 
countercyclical capital requirements would attenuate business cycle peaks and troughs 
through the mechanism demonstrated in this paper.  As the economy expands, loan 
supply should increase via other channels of monetary policy, but the increasing capital-
asset ratio would lead banks to worry about a current or future violation of capital 
adequacy standards.  As a result, loan growth would slow, potentially lowering the rate of 
growth in the real economy.  Alternatively, in response to an economic contraction, banks 
face lower capital requirements, decreasing the pressure on banks to withdraw loan 
supply for fear of future regulatory violations. 
 Finally, a popular proposal (also scheduled to be included as part of Basel III) is 
the imposition of a minimum net stable funding (NSF) ratio.  Under this requirement, 
banks face a certain level of required stable funding based on the maturity profile of their 
assets (with longer dated assets requiring more stable funding).  Banks' available stable 
funding is similarly calculated based on the profile of their liabilities and capital.  
Typically, longer dated liabilities represent more "stable" sources of funding, although 
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insured retail deposits are also included.  The NSF ratio is then computed by dividing 
available stable funding by required stable funding.  On the margin, a minimum amount 
of NSF will decrease a bank's maturity gap as the bank accumulates assets that reprice 
more frequently and/or liabilities that reprice less frequently.  Besides the effects on the 
likelihood of bank failures and financial crises, reducing the liquidity risk of banks in this 
manner will also mitigate the effects of the capital channel.  As this study has shown, 
banks that engage in a smaller degree of asset transformation have loan portfolios that are 
less sensitive to changes in monetary policy.   
 In response to the recent financial crisis, policy makers have proposed numerous 
regulatory changes.  Although many of these changes focus on capital adequacy in some 
way, the empirical research investigating the macroeconomic effects of this type of 
prudential regulation is lacking.  This paper demonstrates some of the increasingly 
important links between regulatory and stabilization policy while simultaneously 
shedding light on a largely unexplored transmission mechanism of monetary policy - the 
bank capital channel. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODELING THE CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS  
OF BANK STRESS: AN EXAMPLE FROM 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
1. Introduction 
Following several decades of calm, the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s sparked a renewed interest in empirical studies of bank failure.  An important line 
of analysis during this period focused on developing early warning systems (EWSs) that 
could be used to alert regulators of distressed banks.  Though some suggest that a useful 
EWS model cannot be built using only currently available accounting data (Randall, 
1989), the weight of the evidence appears to indicate otherwise.  Indeed, regulators spend 
much effort developing EWSs to flag potentially troubled banks even as more frequent 
on-site examinations are conducted pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.  EWSs not only provide regulators 
with a low-cost means of monitoring financial institutions at a high frequency, but also 
yield a more appropriate allocation of scarce resources and examiners.  As a result, 
employing such models most likely serves to reduce the frequency and cost of bank 
failures. 
 However, several issues associated with the use of econometric models in 
financial supervision remain.  First, EWSs require well-defined accounting practices and 
enforcement of penalties assigned to violations.  Second, the causes for distress among 
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banks must be similar through time.  Third, there should be a consistent regulatory 
regime in place across time periods.  A fourth is that the failure of a bank is not an 
automatic consequence of legal or economic insolvency.  EWS models that use failure as 
the outcome variable are describing a conscious decision by regulatory authorities to 
acknowledge and act upon the weakened condition of a bank rather than an objective 
definition of insolvency.  Modeling a regulatory decision rather than economic 
insolvency is a point recognized by both Demirgüc-Kunt (1989a) and Thomson (1991), 
though it is largely ignored in the EWS literature. Another consideration – related to the 
last – is that there has been an increased emphasis on regulating large, systemically 
important institutions, but most failing banks are small in size.  Finally, most bank 
regulators have routinely used EWSs to monitor bank-level risk for many years.  
Unfortunately, several banking crises over the past three decades not only demonstrate 
the difficulty of the task at hand, but also suggest that employing alternative methods 
alongside traditional EWSs may prove helpful.  
 This paper rejects such narrow definitions of financial distress – such as failure or 
acquisition – and attempts to construct a more holistic measure of bank stress, which can 
then be predicted in a way similar to traditional EWSs.  The need for a richer definition 
of distress is highlighted by Peek and Rosengren (1997), who show that most failed 
banks in New England during the 1989-1993 banking crisis were well capitalized prior to 
failure.  Similarly, Jones and King (1995) reveal that most troubled banks between 1984 
and 1989 would not have been classified as undercapitalized by the FDICIA rules.  It is 
clear that relationships between capital and failure identified up to that point were 
inadequate for that particular episode.  This paper argues that regulators would not only 
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benefit from looking to several indicators of bank distress, but also that predictions of 
these indicators can prove useful in identifying at-risk banks.  Furthermore, regulators 
may be interested in anticipating bank outcomes beyond failure.  For example, 
deterioration in bank capital and liquidity positions has been shown to negatively impact 
future loan growth (Kishan & Opiela, 2006).  The implication is that higher levels of 
bank distress may influence the availability of consumer and business credit and could 
potentially lead to other adverse outcomes, such as increased strain in interbank lending 
markets and disruption in the financial system more broadly. 
 Furthermore, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) identifies 
market discipline as one of the three pillars of financial regulation outlined in the Basel 
Accords.  In a sense, the market can be viewed as a separate regulator with market 
outcomes representing “regulatory decisions” akin to the FDIC decisions modeled in the 
bulk of the EWS literature.  It may be of interest, then, to predict market outcomes in a 
way similar to the traditional approach of predicting regulatory outcomes like failure.  By 
combining these features, this paper provides a methodological contribution to the EWS 
literature by predicting a latent measure of bank stress using a Multiple Indicator 
Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model.  The aim - as with traditional EWSs - is to help 
regulators identify troubled financial institutions so that they can take appropriate action 
to head-off potential failures, prevent a contagious loss of confidence, and limit 
disruptions in the market for credit.   
 Though this paper draws heavily from the EWS literature and may be viewed as 
an early warning model in its own right, it contributes to the literature in several ways.  
First, this paper focuses on medium to large financial institutions that are most likely to 
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be systemically important.  Although empirical models of large bank failure exist (see, 
for instance, Kolari, Glennon, Shin, & Caputo, 2002) studies of this type are relatively 
scarce.  Additionally, this study takes a broader view of financial distress than previous 
studies that have tackled a similar issue for large banks.  For instance, Pettway (1980) 
deals with the paucity of large failures by focusing on market outcomes, such as stock 
prices.  Pettway’s strategy of appealing to market outcomes is in the spirit of the current 
study, but again, I take a broader view of bank stress.  Second, this paper does not 
attempt to model a regulatory decision.  Using periods encompassing different regulatory 
regimes and attitudes to form predictions for the future can be problematic.41  Finally, I 
provide an examination of the causes of distress during the height of the subprime 
financial crisis between 2008 and 2009.  By comparing the causes of financial disruption 
during the crisis to earlier studies or taking this model to earlier banking crises, the results 
of this paper may be useful in determining whether the causes of financial distress are 
common over time.  I should reiterate that although the timeframe chosen to investigate 
causes of bank stress may be of great interest, the primary goal of this study is to develop 
a new EWS methodology.  Of course, the sample period chosen for this study allows for 
assessment of the causes of bank-level financial distress during the most recent crisis. 
 Several robust predictors of bank stress are identified in this study.  First, higher 
Tier 1 capital positions were associated with lower levels of stress realized during the 
financial crisis, as were higher levels of liquidity.  Second, it appears that banks financing 
their assets with more stable sources of funding exhibited lower levels of stress.  
                                                 
41
 I should note that although regulatory forbearance during the early and middle stages of the S&L crisis 
presents an issue, the regulatory reform during the S&L crisis in addition to the bank failures during 2007-
2011 provide a more reasonable baseline for comparison with expected future regulatory procedures and 
attitudes. 
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Additionally, the amount of bad loans realized in the year prior to the crisis significantly 
increased future realizations of distress, while holding higher levels of residential real 
estate loans had the opposite effect. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of 
relevant literature.  Section 3 presents the method employed, Section 4 describes the data, 
and Section 5 reports the main results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
 The literature examining bank failure is extremely deep.  Bank failure studies 
cropped up at an especially rapid pace following the increased failures resulting from the 
S&L crisis. As such, popular statistical techniques employed to explain bank failure 
included not just event-history analysis (Lane, Looney, & Wansley, 1986), but also logit 
regression as well as other hazard and survival models.   The dependent variable in these 
studies is typically an indicator that denotes some form of exit such as closure or 
inclusion on the FDIC’s troubled bank list.  Many early studies focused on the inclusion 
of unique covariates and evaluating their predictive power.  Demirgüc-Kunt (1989b) 
provides a summary of bank-level characteristics that have been shown to robustly 
predict failure.  Subsequent work, such as that of Barr, Seiford, and Siems (1994) and 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) focused on including less easily measured predictors such 
as management quality, while others modeled outcomes related to exit such as the timing 
of failures (Cole & Gunther, 1995).  In light of this extensive literature, the goal of this 
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section is not to present an exhaustive overview, but rather to call attention to several 
papers that are particularly pertinent to the present study.   
 For instance, one important development in the literature has been the prediction 
of outcomes beyond failure.  Wheelock and Wilson (2000) examine the causes of both 
acquisition and failure.  For example, low capital-to-asset ratios are associated not just 
with a higher incidence of failure (as documented in previous studies) but are also met 
with higher likelihood of acquisition.  On the other hand, other traditional EWS 
regressors such as measures of inefficiency reduce the probability that a bank will be 
acquired, while increasing the probability of failure.  
 Another notable subset of articles directly addresses the paucity of EWSs for large 
banks.  Given the lack of failure data, Pettway (1976, 1980) evaluates the sensitivity of 
large bank stock prices to bank-level attributes like capital that are often used to explain 
failure.  A main result of these studies – summarized in Flannery (1998) – is that market 
assessments have the ability to provide timely and accurate information to supplement 
regulators’ own information.  The ability to leverage information furnished by financial 
markets is, unfortunately, a luxury afforded only to those studies that focus on large 
financial institutions.  The primary drawback, as mentioned earlier, is that the frequency 
of large bank failures is so low that implementing traditional EWSs becomes difficult.  
The use of market information as both a dependent and independent variable is of 
particular note.  Kolari, et. al. (2002), however, use data collected during the 1980s and 
1990s to perform direct statistical tests of large bank failure.  Included in their sample are 
fifty banks that held more than $250 million in assets at the time of failure.   Using both 
in- and out-of-sample forecasts, the authors conclude that effective EWSs can be 
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constructed for large banks.  Although the $250 million cutoff represents a relatively 
small bank by U.S. standards, the recent crisis induced an increasing number of failures 
among banks holding more than $1 billion in assets.  As such, another direct EWS 
approach for large institutions can be constructed with the new data.  As consolidation in 
the banking sector continues, it is increasingly important that regulators have appropriate 
low-cost screening techniques that can be applied to large institutions. 
 Berger and Bouwman (forthcoming) conduct a study that is similar to the present 
paper in several ways.  First, the authors focus on bank behavior around banking and 
market crises, including the subprime crisis.  Secondly, the authors consider large banks 
(gross total assets exceeding $3 billion) separately.  Finally, Berger and Bouwman 
consider several bank-level outcomes around crises.  In addition to exit, these outcomes 
include competitive positions, profitability, and stock returns.  The results suggest that 
the effects of capital on bank-level outcomes are generally elevated during banking crises 
for large banks.  However, it is worth highlighting some important differences in the 
method described below.  For example, Berger and Bouwman's focus is primarily on the 
different role bank capital may play in normal times as compared with financial crises.  
In addition, although the authors consider several bank-level outcomes, they examine 
each outcome separately whereas the goal here is to combine these outcomes to get a 
sense of the overall level of financial stress a bank is experiencing. 
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3. Method 
 Traditional EWSs are typically constructed by regressing a failure indicator on 
balance sheet characteristics from previous periods.  This process generates several 
limitations that this paper attempts to address.  First, the overwhelming majority of bank 
failures in the United States tend to be concentrated among small banks.  As such, 
traditional EWSs will not necessarily be able to signal trouble looming for larger 
institutions (which are often not even included in samples).  However, the largest banks 
account for an overwhelming majority of system-wide assets and credit.  Moreover, the 
recent financial crisis demonstrated the importance of monitoring systemically important 
institutions.  This has led to the passage of legislation that grants regulators new powers 
regarding the oversight and regulation of such firms. 
 A second drawback associated with traditional EWSs is that financial distress is 
often identified only by its culminating form of bank failure or resolution.  I argue that it 
may be important to identify those banks that face a high risk of becoming severely 
distressed even if the result is not failure.  Although only a relatively small proportion of 
banks typically fails during a recession, severe bank-level stress can lead to excessive 
credit disruptions that can restrain economic recovery or impart an excessive burden on 
bank-dependent borrowers.  Leaving aside the fact that regulators are generally reluctant 
to let large financial institutions fail, predicting bank stress may be useful if a goal is to 
prevent or limit spillover into the macroeconomy generated by credit withdrawal, “fire 
sales” of specialized assets, creditor runs, or sizeable capital crunches.  Having a system 
in place to monitor the likelihood that institutions will experience these types of 
outcomes could lead to a more robust regulatory regime and a healthier banking system. 
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 A final limitation of traditional EWSs is that they model a regulatory decision 
rather than a concrete measure of insolvency.  A consequence of different regulatory 
regimes is that they may produce EWSs that are less useful across time periods.  For 
example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
includes measures aimed at increasing regulators’ options when facing an institution that 
would have previously been deemed “too big to fail” (TBTF).  The new-found vigilance 
against the TBTF policy means that the behavior of regulators over the last thirty years 
cannot be used to guide future regulatory action when dealing with large banks. 
 In light of these drawbacks, the primary goal of this paper is to relate the 
incidence of a broader measure of bank distress to its causes.  Breaking from the 
traditional EWS methodology, my goal is to identify a latent variable I call “bank stress” 
that is an amalgamation of several different indicators associated with bank-level 
financial difficulty.  I then generate predictions of bank stress that can be used by 
regulators in very much the same way that EWSs are used currently.   
In order to measure the contribution of many factors to a latent variable (bank 
stress) that manifests itself in multiple ways, a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause 
(MIMIC) model is used.  The MIMIC model consists of the following set of equations: 
 
,
β ϕ υ= +i j j i iy  (4.1)  
 
,
ϕ δ ε= +i k i k ix  (4.2) 
where yi,j is an observation of stress indicator j for bank i, xi,k is a potential cause of 
distress, k, for bank i, and φi is a latent variable representing the severity of the distress 
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experienced by bank i.  β and δ are coefficient vectors, and υ and ε are well-behaved 
errors.  The first equation links J manifestations of bank stress to the unobservable 
measure of stress severity.  These manifestations are described in detail later, but they 
include capital deterioration, security and loan losses, credit draw downs, government 
assistance, and the decline in an institution’s stock price.  The second equation models 
bank-level stress as a function of K causes.  Substituting the second equation into the first 
yields a model that is no longer a function of the latent variable φi.  This yields a MIMIC 
model that is a system of J equations with right-hand sides restricted to be proportional to 
one another.  These restrictions constrain the structure to be a one-factor model of the 
latent variable.   
 To avoid simultaneity issues and establish a set of predictors that can be identified 
early enough so as to be helpful to regulators, the data for causes are collected prior to the 
summer of 2007 while bank stress is measured between 2008 and 2009.  This method of 
delineating cause and effect is common in the EWS literature.   
 
4. Data 
 
4.1. Indicators 
The primary purpose of employing the method described above is to allow 
examiners and regulators to take a more holistic view of bank stress.  Again, taking a 
broader look at bank stress – rather than using a simple failure indicator – is the primary 
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difference between the present study and much of the EWS literature.  Therefore, the 
most important empirical task is to identify indicators that are expected to be impacted by 
the amount of stress a bank is under (i.e. the latent variable).  As a first step, I consider 
several possible manifestations of bank stress summarized in Table 4.1 for the 306 large 
banks and bank holding companies that existed at the end of the sample.  Again, bank 
stress indicators are measured between 2008Q1 and 2009Q1; a time period that captures 
the most intense portion of the financial crisis.42  Unless stated otherwise, the data used in 
this study are taken from The Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports), which 
contain balance sheet and income statement information for the banks and bank holding 
companies used in this paper.  
The first – and perhaps most obvious – indicator of bank stress is the market value 
of the bank’s equity.  Signs of severe financial distress would cause investors to bid down 
the bank’s stock price as the bank becomes more likely to fail at worst and experience 
below-average growth at best.  However, if bank capital falls to low levels, stockholders 
may become risk-loving, and respond well to more risky strategies.  This behavior has 
been well documented – see Park and Peristiani (2007) for a good summary – and implies 
that shareholders can have interests that are not aligned with those of regulators.  During 
the Savings and Loan crisis, for example, there were many instances of banks engaging in 
risky behavior as they approached failure.  For this reason, it might be preferable to use 
market outcomes on banks’ debt instruments since debt holders have interests that are 
unequivocally aligned with those of regulators.  Although this clear negative response to 
increases in financial distress and failure probabilities is an attractive feature of using an 
                                                 
42
 Bank mergers that occurred during this time period are handled by aggregating the balance sheet and 
income statements of the merged banks. 
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alternate market outcome, compiling a unified measure of bank debt performance is 
prohibitively difficult for such a large sample.  However, Park and Peristiani (2007) 
found that after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
shareholders of large financial institutions appear to have interests that are aligned with 
those of regulators and debt holders (who respond very negatively to increases in 
financial distress and failure probabilities).  A usual limitation of using market outcomes 
in EWSs is that market data are not available for small institutions which comprise the 
bulk of financial intermediaries in the United States.  However, the focus of this study is 
on large financial institutions and stock price data can be found for each bank in the 
sample through the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Table 4.1.  Summary statistics for causes of bank stress.  The three rightmost columns 
report the factor loadings of each indicator on three separate stress factors using 
confirmatory factor analysis.   
Indicator (Change between 2008Q1 and 2009Q1 ) Mean Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3)
1. Stock Return (2009 stock price / 2008 stock price) 54.3% 28.6% 10.6 7.7 7.0
2. Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital Loss (v1)(% change in capital, adjusted for TARP)* -0.7% 2.5% 2.5 3.0 --
3. Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital Loss (v2)(As above, excluding 10/28 TARP injections)** -0.6% 2.5% -- -- 3.1
4. Security Losses(Realized security losses as % of total) -1.0% 3.1% 0.6 0.5 0.5
5. Loan Losses(% change in loan book) 5.5% 16.6% 9.8 8.1 7.6
6. TARP Injection (v1)(-TARP funds received / 2008Q1 Net Asset)* -1.3% 1.3% -- 0.3 --
7. TARP Injection (v2)(As above, excluding 10/28 TARP injections)** -1.3% 1.3% -- -- 0.3
LR Test versus an Independence Model (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
* Including funds received through the Treasury's Targeted Investment Program.
** Excludes the initial TARP funds received by nine large banks on 10/28/08.
Stress Factors
  
 71 
 
 
 The second indicator of the degree of stress experienced by a bank is the size of 
capital drawdown.  This can be measured in many ways, but is measured here as the 
percentage change in bank capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital) between 2008Q1 and 
2009Q1.43  Of course, greater declines over the course of the crisis would be associated 
with a bank that is experiencing a higher level of stress. 
 Similarly, I look at the extent of losses on securities as another gauge of bank 
stress.  The reasoning here is that securities are often included in measures of bank 
liquidity and are (in more normal times) viewed as relatively safe assets for a bank.  
Hence, any bank experiencing losses on its securities needs to worry about a deteriorating 
liquidity position as well as its accounting profits.  Securities losses are measured as the 
sum of realized losses as a fraction of total pre-crisis securities.   
 The fourth manifestation of bank stress I consider is the amount of credit 
withdrawal, measured as the percentage decline in credit extended.  All else equal, banks 
experiencing more hardship would be expected to cut back more on loans given their 
risk, higher capital requirement, and adverse impact on bank liquidity.  In addition, many 
policy makers are concerned with the smooth functioning of credit markets given their 
macroeconomic impact (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992).  Note that bank stress can manifest 
itself directly in lending growth as well as factors that have been shown to impact lending 
growth like capital (Kishan & Opiela, 2000, 2006) and liquidity (Kashyap & Stein, 
2000).  
                                                 
43
 Alternate definitions of the capital ratio were used with little changes to the results reported in the next 
section.  For example, percentage-point changes in the Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital ratio were used as this may 
be seen by some as a better measure of capital decline.  The main results hold. 
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 The fifth and final indicator of bank stress is the U.S. Treasury capital injections 
authorized by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), normalized by pre-crisis bank 
size.  Unlike the previous manifestations of bank stress outlined above, TARP capital 
injections (or some analogue) are not available outside of the sample period selected for 
this study.  One might expect higher TARP injections to be associated with increased 
distress for the following reasons.  First, there was widespread fear that a stigma would 
be attached to the receipt of TARP funds similar to the stigma associated with accessing 
the Federal Reserve's discount window that was present during the early stages of the 
crisis.44  In addition, TARP funds were distributed on the condition that companies would 
lose certain tax benefits, forfeit autonomy over shareholder dividend decisions, and face 
limitations on executive pay (such as curbs on golden parachutes and compensation 
clawback provisions).  Additionally, the first firms to announce repayments of TARP 
funds (such as Goldman Sachs) not only cited these onerous conditions as a motivator, 
but also saw outsized increases in their stock prices upon announcement.  In fact, some 
observers were concerned that lawmakers were taking advantage of TARP to funnel 
money to weak institutions in their districts.  On the other hand, the Treasury's criteria to 
determine which banks would receive funds might have favored healthier financial 
institutions that were most likely to survive (and thus limit the Program's losses).  For this 
reason I consider several different formulations of the bank stress indicator, some of 
which exclude TARP injections.  Approximately half of the institutions in the sample did 
not receive money from TARP. 
                                                 
44
 In fact, the stigma associated with accessing the discount window was a motivating factor behind the 
creation of the Term Auction Facility, which allowed banks to borrow term funds anonymously from the 
Federal Reserve. 
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 Table 4.1 also reports the factor loadings of the indicators for several 
permutations of the latent bank stress variable.  All individual indicators have been 
defined such that a lower value is consistent with higher levels of stress.  Thus, if the 
interpretation presented in this section is correct, one would expect the indicators’ 
loadings to possess the same sign.  As seen in Table 4.1, all indicators load positively on 
the latent factor.  For the remainder of the paper, I multiply the latent stress factors by 
negative one to produce measures that increase in bank stress.  Unsurprisingly, the 
measures of bank stress exhibit a high degree of similarity.  The correlation between each 
of the factors is at least 0.92.  
 
4.2. Causes 
The predictors (causes) of bank stress should possess a few characteristics to be 
useful to regulators and policy makers.  First, the causes should be comprised of 
information that is readily available in a timely fashion.  Because of this, it is natural to 
again use data reported in the Call Reports which are available at a quarterly frequency.  
Secondly, causes should be measured over a period that reasonably predates the 
measurement of bank stress.  This will not only limit simultaneity concerns, but it 
provides enough lead time to regulators that would be interested in acting on results 
obtained from EWSs.  As such, all explanatory variables (causes) are averages realized 
between 2006Q1 and 2007Q1. 
I take advantage of the deep EWS literature to generate a list of potential causes 
of bank stress.  These variables are summarized in Table 4.2 along with their expected 
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impact on bank stress.  Note that although most of the indicators decline with stress, I 
have adopted the convention that a "+" indicates that as the explanatory variable 
increases, one would expect bank stress to increase.  Again, most of these predictors have 
been widely used in the EWS literature, and rather than describe each one in detail here I 
would direct the reader to the literature described in Section 2 for more information.45 
Table 4.2.  Summary statistics for typical EWS covariates.   
Variable Name Definition Impact Mean Std. Dev.
Liquidity Investment Securities / Assets - 19.2% 11.7%
Tier 1 Capital Tier 1 Capital / Risk Weighted Assets - 11.3% 3.3%
MBS Mortgage Backed Securities / Net Assets + 13.9% 9.3%
Bad Loans (Non-accruing  + Late Loans) / Net Assets + 0.9% 0.6%
ROA Net Income / Net Assets - 2.4% 9.8%
Large CDs Large Denom. Time Deposits / Assets + 15.8% 8.6%
Demand Deposits Demand Deposits / Assets - 7.3% 4.4%
Commercial RE Commercial Real Estate Loans/ Assets ? 20.0% 9.4%
Residential RE Residential Real Estate Loans / Assets + 17.7% 10.0%
Non-interest Income Non-interest income / Operating Income - 14.6% 9.6%
Overhead (Fixture + Equipment Costs) / Net Assets + 1.0% 0.4%
Residential RE Gr. % Change in Residential RE + -0.4% 2.1%
Broker Dealer 1 if Brokered Deposits >1% of Net Assets + 59.8% 49.1%
Off Balance Sheet Off Balance Sheet Items / Assets + 0.8% 8.1%
Salary Salary / Net Assets + 3.7% 1.4%
Cause (N=306; Average values between 2006Q1 and 2007Q1 )
 
 
5. Results 
 Results for some representative specifications are reported in Table 4.3.  Recall 
that the indicators are constructed such that an increase in a latent factor is associated 
                                                 
45
 In particular, the following studies have used most of the variables that appear in Table 4: Cole and 
Gunther (1995), Kolari et. al. (2002), and Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995).  
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with higher levels of stress.  As demonstrated by the first row, the pre-crisis Tier 1 capital 
ratio is generally associated with a lower realization of stress.  Although this result is not 
entirely surprising given the findings in the EWS literature (which routinely find a 
negative relationship between capital levels and failure probabilities) I should note that 
the relatively low variation in this ratio made it difficult to predict statistical significance.  
Secondly, banks entering the crisis with more liquid balance sheets experienced lower 
levels of stress during the most intense portion of the crisis. 
 The third predictor of bank stress – mortgage backed security holdings as a 
proportion of assets – is not typically included in traditional EWSs, and was included 
simply as a result of an ex-post understanding of the causes of the crisis.  Of course, the 
use of this method as an a-priori bank sorting mechanism would likely exclude this 
variable.  However, it is interesting to note that it has the expected impact on future 
realizations of stress at the five to ten percent level of confidence (depending on the 
specification).  The fourth line of Table 4.3 shows that those banks entering the height of 
the financial crisis with a history of high non-accruing and past-due loans fared worse.  
Separately, the way in which banks fund themselves also appears to predict financial 
stress.  Banks with a large amount of large-denomination time deposits – which tend to 
be mostly uninsured and less stable – realized higher levels of stress.  This could be a 
result of the difficulty banks had rolling over these types of securities which might lead to 
realized losses on security sales and slower rates of loan growth.  In addition, the 
proportion of assets funded by stable sources such as demand deposits led to lower 
adverse adjustments during the crisis.  Interestingly, one issue taken up by the BCBS 
during the formulation of the Basel III accord is whether banks should be required to 
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meet minimum “stable funding” requirements to finance assets.  The results reported here 
provide empirical support for the stabilizing effects of a net stable funding requirement.  
Table 4.3.  Predicting bank stress.  Various measures of bank stress are predicted 
(summaries of each measure in Table 4.1). Robust p-values are reported beneath the 
corresponding coefficient in italics.  Coefficients that are significant at least at the 10% 
level are in bold text.  All regressions include Federal Reserve District dummies.   
Cause (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Liquidity -0.110 -0.089 -0.088 -0.072 -0.082 -0.068
0.009 0.035 0.006 0.025 0.006 0.022
Tier 1 Capital -0.209 -0.197 -0.147 -0.138 -0.132 -0.124
0.027 0.034 0.042 0.052 0.046 0.058
MBS 0.084 0.078 0.068 0.064 0.064 0.060
0.093 0.112 0.074 0.090 0.069 0.083
Bad Loans 1.129 1.085 0.869 0.836 0.798 0.767
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ROA -0.041 -0.034 -0.029 -0.024 -0.026 -0.021
0.229 0.310 0.266 0.355 0.272 0.363
Large CDs 0.059 0.032 0.046 0.026 0.043 0.024
0.026 0.234 0.022 0.204 0.022 0.198
Demand Deposits -0.135 -0.118 -0.101 -0.089 -0.092 -0.082
0.003 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.010
Commercial RE -0.047 -0.029 -0.037 -0.024 -0.034 -0.022
0.085 0.290 0.075 0.255 0.073 0.248
Residential RE -0.064 -0.057 -0.046 -0.041 -0.041 -0.037
0.009 0.019 0.015 0.029 0.017 0.031
Non-interest Income -0.050 -0.053 -0.036 -0.038 -0.033 -0.035
0.074 0.060 0.092 0.076 0.091 0.077
Overhead 1.854 2.258 1.435 1.736 1.322 1.592
0.010 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.002
Residential RE Growth 0.242 0.223 0.188 0.174 0.173 0.160
0.007 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.011
Broker Dealer -- 0.016 -- 0.012 -- 0.011
0.000 0.000 0.000
Off Balance Sheet Size -- 0.014 -- 0.010 -- 0.008
0.573 0.594 0.631
R-Squared 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.36
Observations 306306
Measure of Bank Stress
306
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 Another interesting result is the negative coefficient on residential real estate 
loans as a percentage of assets.  With a basic understanding of the causes of the recent 
financial crisis, one might ostensibly find this result surprising.  However, it is consistent 
with economic theory that those banks holding more real estate loans would have a larger 
incentive to ensure that they are good investments.  These banks might have developed 
more specialized screening and monitoring procedures for these types of loans.  
Alternatively, those banks packaging and reselling the bulk of their real estate loans, or 
acquiring real estate exposure in the form of mortgage backed securities held for trading 
purposes may either be less assiduous monitors of credit risk or find it more difficult to 
monitor the total risk assumed.  On the other hand, the growth rate of residential loans 
between 2006 and 2007 is positively associated with future realizations of stress.  This 
result is as expected since it captures a period during which the housing market began to 
decline.  Additionally, this variable may be capturing the future misfortunes experienced 
by banks that were getting swept up in the real estate bubble by lowering credit standards. 
 Those banks that have more diversified sources of income, as represented by the 
“non-interest income” covariate, realized lower levels of distress during the crisis.  This 
“diversification” interpretation is consistent with the motivation behind much of the 
financial deregulation in the decades prior to the crisis.  On the expense side, the financial 
difficulty faced by a bank in the crisis is positively related to the proportion of overhead 
costs.  In the EWS literature, this covariate commonly serves as a proxy for managerial 
quality.  Thus, the implication is that poorly managed banks are more susceptible to 
financial downturns.  This finding supports the regulatory practice of evaluating 
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management quality alongside more objective measures of capital adequacy and 
liquidity.46  Finally, those bank holding companies with a substantial broker-dealer 
business tended to do worse during the crisis as well.  Of course, I should reiterate that 
EWSs largely lack strong theoretical underpinnings since the primary goal is to simply 
identify robust predictors of bank distress.  Thus, lending interpretation to the results as I 
have done here is conjectural and these statements warrant more careful study.  
 Having demonstrated several robust predictors of bank stress during the financial 
crisis, I now turn to the question of whether the model did an adequate job of identifying 
high- and low-stress banks.  One strategy to evaluate the success of highlighting high-
stress banks involves the use of regulatory information.  For example, one could compare 
the sample of banks used in this study with the FDIC’s “troubled bank” list.  Observing a 
higher incidence of troubled banks among the highly stressed banks would affirm the 
method outlined in this paper.  However, the troubled bank list is not published for fear 
that it would lead to a run on institutions added to the list.  A second strategy might 
involve looking at the time the banks took to pay back the TARP funds.  While this 
exercise may be instructive, there are selection issues (low-stress banks by definition 
have less TARP funds to pay back) and banks may be motivated to hold their TARP 
injection for reasons unrelated to balance sheet health (to finance a merger, for instance).   
 In future work, it would be useful to evaluate the extent to which bank stress has 
explanatory power in a traditional EWS.  Although including market outcomes in the 
measure of bank-level stress may prove impossible, one would expect highly stressed 
                                                 
46
 I should also note that (while not reported in Table 3) those banks with higher salaries as a share of total 
expenses did not fare any better (or worse) during the crisis in terms of stress levels. 
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banks to be at greater risk of failure in future periods.  Observing this result would lend 
confidence to the interpretation and significance of the bank stress variable. 
 It is also possible to evaluate anecdotal evidence when assessing the reliability of 
the stress indicator.  This method is of course fraught with potential problems and should 
be met with some degree of skepticism.  However, some of the most publicized outcomes 
accord with the results achieved in this paper.  For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase is among 
the low-stress banks, while Citigroup and Bank of America appear in the ranks of the 
high-stress banks.   
 To evaluate whether I have accurately separated high- and low-stress banks more 
formally, I take advantage of the emergency lending programs initiated by the Federal 
Reserve during the recession.  Although some programs were aimed at inducing banks to 
participate in troubled credit markets by underwriting profits, others were created to 
provide financial institutions with desperately needed liquidity.  One important feature of 
these programs was the anonymity they provided the borrowers.  This anonymity was 
required to encourage troubled banks to freely participate in these programs without 
facing the stigma associated with short-term borrowing from either the interbank market 
or the Federal Reserve’s discount window.  The information on banks accessing these 
programs was ultimately made public, however, at the urging of Congress.  Table 4.4 
summarizes bank participation in both the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).  Both of these lending programs were introduced 
relatively early, and one would generally expect the most financially distressed banks to 
make greater use of these programs.  Indeed, this is the pattern that appears.  Not only 
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were highly stressed banks more likely to participate in these programs, but (conditional 
on participation) they also drew more heavily on the TAF and PDCF. 
  Finally, I should note that this paper does not (yet) attempt to identify a threshold 
level of bank stress that would be considered worrisome.  However, as with traditional 
EWSs, the technique presented here can be used as a sorting mechanism to prioritize on-
site exams.  Therefore, it is most important that the method provides an ordinal ranking 
of potentially at-risk banks.   
Table 4.4.  Bank participation in Federal Reserve emergency liquidity facilities.  The 
"Most Stressed Decile" contains 31 banks with the highest values of stress factor (3).  
The "Least Stressed Decile" contains 31 banks with the lowest stress factor (3) scores.  
The final column - Count - refers to the number of banks in each decile that received 
TAF of PDCF funds during the measurement period.   
Stress Factor (3) Mean* Median* Count
Most Stressed Decile 9.5% 12.8% 11
Least Stressed Decile 2.7% 3.7% 5
* Conditional on receiving funds.
(TAF + PDCF Funds Received) / Total Assets 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 The primary contribution of this paper is to provide a method for measuring bank 
distress that does not merely model the way in which regulators have closed banks in the 
past.  Ultimately, this has the potential to lower the frequency and costs of future 
disruptions in the financial sector.  In addition, regulators are charged with developing a 
risk-matrix that can be used as a basis for initiating on-site examinations, assessing 
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deposit insurance premiums, or levying fees to cover the costs of future bailouts.  
Looking at a composite measure of “bank stress” can be useful in such endeavors.  
Furthermore, this methodology has the potential to signal episodes of heightened bank 
stress even if that does not lead to a high rate of failures. 
Second, this paper helps clarify factors that increased the likelihood of financial 
distress during the subprime crisis.  As a result, it appears that an early warning system 
would have been useful in mitigating the severity of the crisis.  From a regulatory 
standpoint, it is interesting to note that banks would have better prepared to face the crisis 
with higher Tier 1 capital ratios (as has since been mandated by Basel III).  Additionally, 
the recently legislated requirement (in the Dodd-Frank) that mandates banks retain a 
portion of their originated residential loans is seemingly supported by these results.  
Finally, it appears that (at a minimum) close monitoring of healthy banks’ non-
performing loan rate may be worthwhile. 
 Preventing financial crises may prove increasingly difficult as regulators face 
larger institutions, greater bank connectivity, and rapid financial innovation.  Even in the 
absence of these developments, many observers suggest that financial crises are 
inevitable and it is unlikely that regulators can successfully prevent future panics.  At a 
minimum, however, informed regulators can help reduce the frequency and cost of such 
crises as we learn from mistakes and experience.  Developing a more robust early 
warning system for large financial institutions as attempted by this paper can serve as a 
useful tool for regulators in the effort to achieve a more stable and resilient banking 
system.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The preceding chapters have demonstrated the usefulness of analyzing bank 
balance sheets to better understand important phenomena.  In the case of Chapter II, I 
show that the so-called “balance sheet channel” can have uneven impacts on large and 
small borrowers.  This study uses a unique strategy to identify the balance sheet channel, 
and provides evidence that the effect is in fact driven by the borrower (rather than lender) 
profile.  Furthermore, this study focuses on ascertaining evidence of a financial 
mechanism through which the balance sheet channel works.  In many previous studies, 
evidence further downstream – such as spending and investment decisions – is used to 
demonstrate the existence of the channel while a financial mechanism is assumed.   
Separately, Chapter III illustrates that a complete understanding of how monetary 
policy works requires an evaluation of the financial condition of banks.  Specifically, I 
show that the strength of monetary policy actions can depend on the capital adequacy of 
the banking sector.  Besides contributing to a scarce empirical literature, this finding is 
important for policy makers.  Properly assessing the stance of monetary policy at a given 
point in time is essential, and Chapter III demonstrates that bank-level capital concerns 
can influence the availability of credit.  Furthermore, it is critical to understand the lag-
times and ultimate strength associated with policy changes.  This chapter finds that the 
quantity and distribution of capital across the banking sector can inform these issues. 
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Finally, Chapter IV proposes a methodological contribution to an existing 
literature that attempts to identify banks at risk of failure.  I argue that it is useful for 
policymakers and regulators to predict not just failure, but also the degree of financial 
stress a bank will experience in the future.  Periods of severe financial stress – 
particularly at large financial institutions – can lead to many of the same adverse effects 
of bank failure.  I apply this method to produce a set of bank-level characteristics 
associated with greater difficulty during the height of the subprime financial crisis.  
Understanding the factors that signal a weakening bank can potentially lead to a more 
resilient financial system that is then less likely to export disruptions to the real economy. 
The importance of banks to developed economies can be immense.  For many 
individuals and businesses banks or thrifts may be the only source of credit.  As such, 
banks supply the financing necessary for a tremendous amount of investment and 
consumption that contributes to a higher growth rate and quality of life.  Among other 
things, workers use these loans to acquire desired human capital and improve their 
standard of living, while businesses depend on credit to make payrolls, carry inventory, 
fund research projects, and launch new products.  Thus, it is not appropriate to draw a 
stark dichotomy between the financial and real sectors of the economy.  In fact, with 
appropriate regulation and policy, the relationship between these sectors can be 
incredibly positive and symbiotic.  It is the aim of this dissertation to help cultivate this 
positive relationship by adding to the understanding of the factors that can generate 
disruptions in the supply of intermediated credit. 
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APPENDIX A 
ROBUSTNESS CONSIDERATIONS 
Table A.1 presents results of robustness checks.  Only the coefficient on the FFR 
is reported for parsimony.  Although results by group are not reported, patterns are very 
similar to those in Table 2.2.  A short description of each panel follows: 
Panel A considers loans to small firms to be those loans less than $250,000. 
Panel B uses state-specific measures of real activity.  The coincident economic activity 
index for each state and a state-specific unemployment rate were used. 
Panel C replaces the FFR with the negative of the Bernanke-Mihov (1998) Index (so that 
an increase indicates a monetary tightening). 
Panel D replaces a time trend with time fixed effects. 
 Panel E assumes the Baa-Aaa spread is endogenous. 
Panel F assumes exogenous bank liquidity. 
Panel G constructs an alternate measure of inflation expectations for construction of the 
real FFR. 
Panel H includes the spread between 10 year and 3 month United States Treasury 
Securities. 
Panel I excludes the net interest margin from the vector of covariates. 
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Table A.1.  Robustness checks for results reported in Table 2.2.  Only the coefficient on 
the measure of monetary policy is reported.  Robust p-values are reported beneath the 
corresponding coefficient in italics.  Coefficients that are significant at least at the 10% 
level are in bold text. 
Panel A - Loans to Small Firms <= $250,000
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.266 -0.219
0.000 0.000
Panel B - State-specific Measures of Real Activity
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.192 -0.211
0.005 0.001
Panel C - Negative of Bernanke-Mihov (1998) Index 
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Bernanke-Mihov -3.015 -3.640
0.002 0.000
Panel D - Allowing for Time Fixed Effects
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.757 -0.660
0.000 0.000
Panel E - Endogenous Baa-Aaa Spread
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.222 -0.215
0.000 0.000
Panel F - Assuming Exogenous Bank Liquidity
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.537 -0.406
0.005 0.018
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Table A.1.  (continued) 
Panel G - Using the ex-ante Real Rate (Mishkin,1981 method)
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.064 -0.064
0.059 0.043
Panel H - Inclusion of Yield Curve Measure
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.346 -0.287
0.000 0.002
Panel I - Excluding the Net Interest Margin Regressor
C&I Loans C&I + CRE Loans
Coefficient to Small Firms to Small Firms
Fed Funds Rate -0.229 -0.237
0.001 0.000
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APPENDIX B 
EXAMINING BANK SIZE CLASSIFICATIONS 
 In the main text of the paper, size classes were chosen for comparison with 
existing credit channel literature.  However, it is possible to search for size class 
thresholds around which the value of γ  (from equation 2.6) achieves significantly 
different values.  The method employed is similar to that described in Hansen (1999).  
However, the method outlined by the Hansen threshold model does not accommodate 
dynamic panels since standard transformations used to eliminate fixed effects will still 
lead to correlation between the error term and the endogenous variables.  Extending this 
model, Kremer, Bick, and Nautz (2009) (henceforth KBN) use forward orthogonal 
deviations to eliminate fixed effects.  The authors show that this transformation produces 
uncorrelated error terms.  I should note that in this particular case, employing the KBN 
method presents several limitations.  The most significant one is that it becomes 
necessary to assign a single size class to each bank over its lifetime.   
 Figure B.1 plots the estimate of the FFR coefficient (with confidence intervals) 
for a rolling size class "window" as indicated.  Vertical lines are included at thresholds 
identified by using the KBN threshold model.  As indicated, it appears that there is a 
"very small" size class of banks that exhibit a balance sheet channel that is stronger than 
the "small" banks between the 71st and 83rd percentiles.  Applying these coefficient 
estimates to the full sample, the impact on small firm credit reported in the main text is 
slightly reduced when taking into account these compositional differences. 
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Figure B.1.  Coefficient on FFR from estimations of rolling size-class windows up to the 
ninetieth percentile.  The values on the horizontal axis represent size percentiles.  Vertical 
lines are positioned at KBN-style threshold estimates. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASYMMETRY ACROSS THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
 Does the balance sheet channel exhibit asymmetry across the business cycle?  The 
answer to this question would be useful to policymakers concerned with the fortunes of 
small businesses during recessions.  Though a longer time series would be ideal to test 
such an asymmetry, strategies to investigate this issue are at hand.  The first - and 
simplest - method is to include a dummy variable indicating a recession in the subset of 
covariates and interacting that with the measure of monetary policy.  In the sample period 
covered, this amounts to a dummy taking the value of one in 2001 and 2008 only.  
Unfortunately, this method of detecting business cycle asymmetries yields insignificant 
results, or positive effects of monetary tightening on the SBL ratio.  However, the 
identification strategy described in the paper is not ideal for testing asymmetries over the 
business cycle in this manner.  The reason is that the SBL likely receives upward pressure 
from factors influencing loan demand similar to those described in Section 3.  To the 
extent that GDP and unemployment regressors only imperfectly control for the business 
cycle (a plausible assumption since I use forecasted values and there are timing issues 
introduced by the annual measurement) the recession dummy may be picking up noise 
generated by the increased loan demand of small firms relative to large firms during 
recessions.47 
 As a second test, I include an interaction term in the baseline regressions that is 
equal to averages of (actual) GDP growth multiplied by the monetary policy indicator.  A 
                                                 
47
 Further clouding the issue of whether this "recession dummy" method is preferred for the purpose at 
hand is the fact that the 2008 "financial crisis" dummy included in the baseline regressions is almost always 
negative and significant. 
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"stronger" balance sheet channel in recessions would imply a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term.  That is, as GDP growth falls, the sensitivity of the SBL ratio to 
monetary actions is intensified.  When this interaction term is included in regressions 
with the measure of monetary policy, its coefficient is negative for small banks, but 
significant only at the twelve percent level of confidence for SBL1 (C&I loans only).48  
The implication of this result is that the balance sheet channel is weakened during 
recessions.  However, several caveats remain.  First, although the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the interaction term for SBL2 seems large, considering the "total" effect of 
a change in GDP wipes out any economic significance.  Moving from the highest to 
lowest GDP reading in the sample alters the sensitivity of the SBL ratio to FFR by less 
than ten percent.  Second, this interaction term itself is not robust to the considerations 
outlined in Appendix A.  This characteristic remains even when the 2008 dummy is 
removed.  Finally - and most importantly - interacting alternate measures of monetary 
policy with GDP growth causes any previous statistical significance of this term to 
completely evaporate.  The results of this exercise are reported in Table C.1 in the first 
line of panels A and B. 
 Alternatively, I consider interacting the FFR with a dummy for both "slow 
growth" regimes and “rapid growth" regimes.  Slow growth years occur when measures 
of GDP growth are below median, whereas rapid growth years are those in which 
measures of GDP growth are above median.  These results are reported in the bottom of 
each panel of Table C.1.  This method provides additional support for the notion that the 
                                                 
48
 The average GDP growth over the prior two quarters was used to better capture business cycle volatility.  
Since the recessions in the sample were all relatively short, four quarter averages smooth the recessions and 
reduce the volatility of this measure. 
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balance sheet channel is weaker during low-growth (though not necessarily recessionary) 
periods.  The results are highly significant for small banks when using either SBL1 or 
SBL2 as the dependent variable. 
Table C.1.  Business cycle asymmetry investigations.  Only the coefficient on the 
measure of monetary policy is reported.  Robust p-values are reported beneath the 
corresponding coefficient in italics.  Coefficients that are significant at least at the 10% 
level are in bold text.  In the top portion of each panel is the coefficient of the monetary 
policy measure interacted with trailing GDP growth.  The bottom rows of each panel 
report coefficients on FFR for below-median GDP growth years ("Slow Growth") and 
above-median years ("Rapid Growth"). 
Panel A - Dependent Variable: SBL1 (Share of C&I Loans to Small Firms)
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th All
Coefficient percentile percentile percentile Banks
Interaction with GDP Growth
FFR*(GDP growth) -0.024 -0.013 0.027 -0.021
0.126 0.300 0.391 0.148
Dummies for Slow-Growth Regimes vs. Rapid-Growth Regimes
FFRSlow Growth -0.257 0.085 -0.127 -0.203
0.002 0.060 0.617 0.007
FFRRapid Growth -0.307 0.069 -0.114 -0.241
0.000 0.085 0.612 0.000
Panel B - Dependent Variable: SBL2 (Share of C&I and CRE Loans to Small Firms)
< 90th 90th - 98th > 98th All
Coefficient percentile percentile percentile Banks
Interaction with GDP Growth
FFR*(GDP growth) -0.034 -0.003 0.033 -0.030
0.027 0.652 0.330 0.029
Dummies for Slow-Growth Regimes vs. Rapid-Growth Regimes
FFRSlow Growth -0.233 -0.018 -0.171 -0.189
0.002 0.590 0.339 0.006
FFRRapid Growth -0.316 -0.016 -0.143 -0.260
0.000 0.596 0.366 0.000
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 In summary, the data appear to indicate that the balance sheet channel is weaker 
during recessionary periods.  However, the tests reported here indicate that this 
interpretation is inconclusive, and there may be no significant asymmetry present.  
Primarily for this reason, the consideration of this matter is excluded from the main text 
of the paper. 
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APPENDIX D 
MATURITY GAP REGRESSIONS 
 In order to generate maturity gaps for each bank across all time periods, a 
prediction approach must be used.  Taking advantage of the maturity information 
contained in the notes and memoranda from the Call Reports beginning in 2006, I form 
actual bank-level maturity gaps.  Next, I regress these observed maturity gaps on broad 
balance sheet characteristics to form "prediction equations" that can be used to generate 
maturity gaps for banks in each time period.  The regression summarized in Table D.1 
was used to create the bank-level maturity gaps for Table 3.3.  Though results are 
reported for 2006Q4 only, I should note that the coefficient estimates are very stable 
throughout the period over which maturity gap regressions can be run.  Finally, many 
additional specifications (often with more covariates) were used.  These additional 
maturity gap regressions produced an adjusted R2 of between 0.31 and 0.38, and all yield 
similar results to those presented in the paper.   
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Table D.1.  Maturity gap regression for 2006Q4.  The following equation contains 
estimates from a simple OLS regression of constructed (actual) maturity gap on balance 
sheet characteristics.  Size is measured as the natural log of total assets, and Mutual, 
Cooperative, and Org. Type: Other are dummy values that take a value of one based on a 
financial institution’s organization structure.  These coefficients are used to predict bank-
level maturity gaps for the entire sample. 
Maturity gap regression
Securities/Assets 5.517
0.000
Transaction Accts. -2.281
0.000
Non-Transaction Accts. -0.973
0.000
Personal/Assets 2.307
0.000
RE Loans/Assets 2.621
0.001
Size 0.159
0.000
Mutual 3.293
0.000
Cooperative 2.791
0.001
Org. Type: Other -2.566
0.001
Observations 8,030
Adjusted R 2 0.31
Dependent Variable: 
Maturity Gap (2006:4)
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